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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The conceptual and jurisprudential basis of property in indigenous culture differs 
from notions of property, especially private property, in the modern economic order.1 
Private property is a central and pivotal precept in the modern economic order; it 
holds a place of primacy and deference.2 In part, this is because private property 
functions significantly as a foundation of economic exchanges at all levels of society 
around the world. These exchanges include a variety of forms, which in turn generate 
more property and more value, including that emerging from their inextricable link 
to what property law professor Margaret Jane Radin calls “personhood.”3
 Processes through which property in its real and intellectual forms is ascertained, 
valued, and exchanged for value are the subject of centuries’ worth of analysis and 
continuing understanding in the West.
 In this context, real and intellectual property interests reflect important aspects 
of the organization of modern society. As the basis of the modern economic order, 
these interests are commodities that may be readily exchanged in various forms of 
security and traded for value.4 In this neoliberal political economy, sustainability is 
subordinate to resource exploitation.
 Across indigenous cultures, the position of real and intellectual property is 
different. In many contexts, land is not an aspect of the indigenous community; it is 
the basis of the community itself, especially regarding the community’s culture and 
spiritual beliefs.5 In short, because land provides the basis of the community, the 
expropriation of land threatens the community’s physical, cultural, and spiritual 
1. See Alejandro Fuentes, Cultural Diversity and Indigenous People’s Land Claims: Argumentative 
Dynamics and Jurisprudential Approach in the Americas 179–85 (Apr. 18, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Trento), available at http://rwi.lu.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Alejandro-
Fuentes-doctoral-thesis.pdf; see also Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied 
and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities 
to future generations in this regard.”).
2. See generally James A. Dorn, The Primacy of Property in a Liberal Constitutional Order, 7 Indep. Rev. 485 
(2003).
3. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 957 (1982) (“The premise 
underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-development—to be a person—an 
individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.”).
4. This was not always the case in the older feudal tradition of Western society. Land was not a commodity; 
it was connected to status. So enduring was this idea that it was only in 1925 that the English Law of 
Property Act finally codified the idea that land could be commodified for the market. This was 
accomplished by consolidating and modernizing English property law, enabling a transition from a legal 
regime which vested all property ownership in the crown—where no private conveyance was possible 
since land could only pass through feudal title—to one where land could be transferred and leased by 
and between citizens. See generally J. Stuart Anderson, Lawyers and the Making of English 
Land Law 1832–1940 (1992).
5. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights explained, in Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua, the important relationship between indigenous peoples, their land, and the sustainability of 
their culture and spirituality:
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existence. Indeed, the destruction of the land’s ecological integrity threatens the 
community’s survival. In a larger sense, the survival of all societies depends on the 
viability and ecological sustainability of Earth’s resources.
 The indigenous idea that land resources are not an aspect of social order, but the 
basis of it, represents a clash of conceptual and normative values that challenges the 
foundations of the neoliberal political economy and its notions of private property.
 The importance of property to indigenous peoples is born out of a history of 
deprivation, as countless indigenous peoples have been subject to colonial or 
neocolonial conquests. For centuries, communities have found themselves displaced, 
landless, and impoverished as new alien elites have sought to acquire their land and 
knowledge, often through force, pseudo-law, and trickery.6
 This article draws attention to several problems relating to indigenous ownership 
of both real and intellectual property, and their related impact upon the well-being 
and essential dignity of indigenous peoples. Part II of this article introduces the 
concept of indigenous ownership of real and intellectual property. Part III digs 
deeper into challenges to indigenous ownership of land, using the Shuar people of 
Ecuador as a case study. Part IV examines the problem of bioprospecting, as well as 
some of its implications, and discusses how the problem has affected the Shuar. It 
additionally summarizes a few steps toward developing an effective strategy to 
confront the problem of bioprospecting as it applies to the Shuar. Finally, Part V 
concludes with an analysis of possible strategies to either stem or combat the effects 
of appropriation of indigenous peoples’ land and knowledge.
ii. indigEnOUs pEOpLEs and COntEstatiOns fOr indigEnOUs rEsOUrCEs
 There is perhaps no issue more central to the survival of indigenous nations, 
groups, and peoples around the world than the question of property—both real and 
intellectual.
 For indigenous communities, real property—land—often represents a spatial 
dimension of the culture and the foundation of social process; it is central to 
community existence, and represents the essence of cultural identity, as well as 
Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regarding a communal 
form of collective property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not 
centered on an individual but rather on the group and its community. Indigenous groups, 
by the fact of their very existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory; the 
close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood as the 
fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic 
survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a matter of 
possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully 
enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.
 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001).
6. See generally Robert A. Williams, Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: 
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 Duke L.J. 660; Ethel Emily 
Wallis, Aucas Downriver: Dayuma’s Story Today (1973).
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spiritual and material patrimony.7 It has a special and vital connection to the idea of 
community, culture, respect, and human rights. The question of land ownership has 
been a central and contested point in the struggle to protect the human rights of 
indigenous peoples.8 Land is critical to their survival.
 Throughout the history of the Americas, the effort to acquire land by aliens has 
been driven by greed and cultural dominance. Early in the history of Latin America, 
the conquest of Indian communities generated the question of who owned the 
conquered lands.9 A succession of popes, starting with Alexander VI in 1493, claimed 
ownership of these lands and the right to award it to the Catholic faithful. To cement 
these claims, legal opinions were sought from distinguished juris consults, including 
a priest named Francisco de Vitoria. De Vitoria’s opinion, though, rooted in natural 
law jurisprudence,10 repudiated the pope’s claim and affirmed that indigenous 
peoples’ interest in land was sustained by natural law.11
 The recognition that natural law should justify indigenous property ownership 
was significantly changed with the drafting of Brazil’s first constitution.12 Although 
the drafters recognized that natural law would limit their ability to expropriate 
Indian land, they did not feel that Indians should be given any such legal support to 
protect their interests. Instead, they emerged with the notion that Indian land 
interests were limited to those interests above the surface of the land.13 These might 
7. See Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People and Their Relationship to Land, Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities, Comm’n on Human Rts., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/25 (June 30, 2000) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes).
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., James Muldoon, Papal Responsibility for the Infidel: Another Look at Alexander VI’s Inter Caetera, 
64 Cath. Hist. Rev. 168 (1978).
10. Natural law describes legal conditions and principles which purport to derive from nature and thus from 
good and proper human order across forms of individual and group conduct. See H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law 156 (3d ed. 2012) (“[The Thomist tradition of Natural Law] comprises a twofold 
contention: first, that there are certain principles of true morality or justice, discoverable by human reason 
without the aid of revelation even though they have a divine origin; secondly, that man-made laws which 
conflict with these principles are not valid law.”); see also Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 
Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958) (offering a natural law alternative to positivism in the international context).
11. In his celebrated De Indis, de Vitoria argued that indigenous peoples in the Americas were—and had 
ever been—vested with inalienable rights under natural law, including those over the land on which 
they resided. De Vitoria attributed these rights to the indigenous peoples’ human nature itself, which in 
his view could not be withheld by anyone, including the pope, in the absence of a just war. See Francisco 
de Vitoria, On the American Indian (1532), reprinted in Francisco de Vitoria: Political 
Writings 278–84 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence trans., 1991); see also Francisco de Vitoria, 
I On the Power of the Church (1532), reprinted in Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writings, 
supra, at 45, 84 (arguing that natural law, which is common to all cultures, predominates over all nations 
and can thus be deemed a “law of nations,” or ius gentium, which itself is part of a larger declaration of 
human rights). A range of scholars have similarly suggested that human rights are endowed with natural 
law because they are inherent rights, and thus not activated by sovereigns, states, or legal regimes. See, 
e.g., Richard Falk, Reviving the World Court 116 (1986).
12. See Constituição Política do Império do Brazil [Constitution] Mar. 25, 1824 (Braz.).
13. See id. arts. 131–36, 178.
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include occupancy rights or grazing rights. However, all resources under the surface 
were determined, by the constitution itself, to belong to the state.14 This interpretation 
of indigenous ownership rights might be viewed as an extension of the medieval-
maxim-turned-civil-law-precept made famous by Sir Edward Coke: Cuius est solum, 
eius est usque ad coelom (“He who owns the soil owns also up to the sky”).15 The 
renowned eighteenth-century English jurist William Blackstone extended this 
concept to include private ownership of subsurface rights,16 but the Brazilian 
Constitution bent this precept to its breaking point by vesting subsurface ownership 
in the state rather than private landholders. Certainly, these distinctions could create 
ambiguities that could lead to the taking of indigenous property by brute force.
 Just as land rights are critical to the survival of indigenous cultures, so too are their 
intellectual property rights to knowledge accumulated over the course of generations. 
Intellectual property in indigenous communities is considered their “Traditional 
Knowledge.” There remains some disagreement among authoritative international 
commentators concerning the definition of “Traditional Knowledge” and how best to 
institutionalize protections.17 In any case, it is commonly understood that the use of the 
14. See id. art. 2.
15. See Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institute of the Laws of England 4.a. (Garland 
Publ’g, 1979) (1628) (“[T]he earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not only of water, as hath been 
said, but of ayre and all other things, even up to heaven, for cujus est solum ejuts est usque ad coelom . . . .”).
16. Blackstone’s variation on the precept, as articulated by Coke, was to extend the direction of property 
ownership downward: “Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent upwards as well as 
downwards.” See William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England 14 (Wayne 
Morrison ed., 2001). The phrase itself (“cujus est solum ejuts est usque ad coelom”) originates with thirteenth-
century Roman law scholar Accursius. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the 
International Community 301–02 (1933).
17. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provides a definition of “Traditional Knowledge”:
“Traditional knowledge,” as a broad description of subject matter, generally includes the 
intellectual and intangible cultural heritage, practices and knowledge systems of 
traditional communities, including indigenous and local communities . . . . In other 
words, traditional knowledge in a general sense embraces the content of knowledge 
itself as well as traditional cultural expressions, including distinctive signs and symbols 
associated with traditional knowledge. In international debate, “traditional knowledge” 
in the narrow sense refers to knowledge as such, in particular the knowledge resulting 
from intellectual activity in a traditional context, and includes know-how, practices, 
skills, and innovations. Traditional knowledge can be found in a wide variety of 
contexts, including: agricultural knowledge; scientific knowledge; technical knowledge; 
ecological knowledge; medicinal knowledge, including related medicines and remedies; 
and biodiversity-related knowledge, etc. 
 Definition of “Traditional Knowledge”, World Intell. Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/
resources/glossary.html#49 (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); see also Coenraad Visser, Making Intellectual 
Property Laws Work for Traditional Knowledge, in Poor People’s Knowledge: Promoting 
Intellectual Property in Developing Countries 207, 234 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler 
eds., 2004) (detailing the various definitions of the phrase “Traditional Knowledge” in a series of 
different sources of international law, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive). Traditional 
Knowledge can include learned practices and the development of technology, such as cross-pollination 
of f lowers to encourage certain medicinal characteristics, or ascertaining when the rainy season is 
approaching by the timing of certain blooming f lora. Traditional Knowledge further includes any 
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word “traditional” is not meant to describe this knowledge as rudimentary or dated, 
but rather as rooted in a community’s traditions and incrementally refined over time. 
This knowledge is generally collective—it is the common heritage of the community as 
a whole, and is not individually owned—and it is used by indigenous societies to sustain 
their cultural practices.18 In other words, “Traditional Knowledge” refers to an inventory 
of natural resources, including species of local flora and fauna, and an understanding 
that certain combinations of plant and animal extracts may yield certain effects when 
administered to a patient in a particular way. In practical terms, “Traditional 
Knowledge” might refer to the way shamans in an indigenous culture have ascertained 
over time that certain plants have special properties.19 It is to this collection of 
knowledge that certain legal protections could be applied.
iii. thE shUar natiOn Of ECUadOr and thE Land QUEstiOn
 The Shuar20 are an indigenous21 community of more than 40,00022 people who 
live in a stretch of territory in southeastern Ecuador proximate to the upper 
system of secular or spiritual beliefs with significance to a group’s health, economic well-being, and 
relationship to nature. See generally Charles McManis, Biodiversity and the Law: Intellectual 
Property, Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge (2007).
18. See Definition of “Traditional Knowledge”, supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., Sarah Laird, Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships in 
Practice 6 (2002) (stating that ethnobiologists might study plants and animals by examining “local 
innovations, traditional knowledge and practices . . . [and] [t]his local knowledge may be documented to 
preserve or share within the community or beyond it”); see also Eric Chivian & Aaron Bernstein, How Is 
Biodiversity Threatened by Human Activity, in Sustaining Life: How Human Health Depends on 
Biodiversity 42 (Eric Chivian & Aaron Bernstein eds., 2008) (explaining the dangers of overharvesting 
plant germplasm with medicinal qualities and citing examples, such as the Rosy Periwinkle plant of 
Madagascar).
20. The word “Shuar” (also “šuarä” or “šiwar”) can be variously translated to mean “man,” “men,” or “people” in 
the Shuar language. See Michael J. Harner, The Jivaro: People of the Sacred Waterfalls 14 (1973).
21. The term “indigenous” is a notably murky one from the standpoint of the international community. For 
example, according to the World Bank’s Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples:
“[I]ndigenous peoples,” “indigenous ethnic minorities,” “tribal groups,” and “scheduled 
tribes” . . . describe “social groups with a social and cultural identity distinct from the 
dominant society that makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the 
development process.” . . . Since no single definition can capture all these groups, the OD 
[Operational Directive] describes social groups to be covered as those that “can be 
identified in particular geographical areas by the presence in varying degrees of the 
following characteristics: (a) a close attachment to ancestral territories and to the 
natural resources in these areas; (b) self-identification and identification by others as 
members of a distinct cultural group; (c) an indigenous language, often different from 
the national language; (d) presence of customary social and political institutions; and (e) 
primarily subsistence-oriented production.
 See World Bank, Implementation of Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples: An Evaluation of 
Results, ¶ 1.8 & n.5, Rep. No. 25754 (Apr. 10, 2003) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In an attempt 
to reconcile various definitions of indigenous groups, Dr. Erica-Irene A. Daes, former Chair and 
Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, set out four criteria 
designed to ascertain if a group could be classified as indigenous:
881
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
mountains of the Andes, in the Amazon Basin. Members of the Shuar leadership 
estimate that the society has resided in the same part of the Ecuadorian rainforest for 
more than four thousand years.23 They have retained cultural beliefs and practices 
notwithstanding the increasing proliferation of non-Shuar influences. The traditional 
territory of the Shuar is one of Earth’s most precious resources of biodiversity;24 the 
Shuar experience underlines the legal complexity that indigenous peoples must 
navigate, often without legal advice or representation.
 A. A Trend Appraisal of Shuar Land Entitlements Under the Law
 In the early 1960s, the Shuar organized the political foundations of the nation along 
the lines of a federal, democratic form of internal governance; they founded the 
(a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory; (b) The 
voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include the aspects of 
language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and 
institutions; (c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by State 
authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and (d) An experience of subjugation, marginalization, 
dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist.
 Chairperson-Rapporteur on the Concept of Indigenous People, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of 
Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
AC.4/1996/2, at 69 (June 10, 1996) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes). See generally Douglas E. Sanders, The 
Formation of The World Council of Indigenous Peoples (1977); S. James Anaya, Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law (2004); Ken Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples: 
Struggle and Survival (2004); Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies (Norman 
K. Denzin et al. eds., 2008); Indigenous Peoples and Poverty: An International Perspective 
(Robyn Eversole et al. eds., 2006); Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Duncan 
Ivison et al. eds., 2000); Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance to Globalization (Jerry 
Mander & Victoria Tauil-Corpuz eds., 2006); Bradley Reed Howard, Indigenous Peoples and the 
State: The Struggle for Native Rights (2003); Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and 
Human Rights (2002); Indigenous Knowledge and Education: Sites of Struggle, Strength, 
and Survivance (Malia Villegas et al. eds., 2008); Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and 
United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and Land (2007).
22. Estimates of the total population of the Shuar vary. See Theodore Macdonald, Amazonian Indigenous 
Views on the State: A Place for Corporate Social Responsibility?, 33 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 439, 445 
(2010) (estimating the Shuar population to be between 30,000 and 40,000). But see Betty J. Meggers, 
Amazonia: Man and Culture in a Counterfeit Paradise 56 (1971) (estimating the Shuar 
population to be about 20,000); Harner, supra note 20, at 14 (citing a Summer Institute of Linguistics 
house count conducted in 1956–57 which estimated that the Shuar population was about 7,830).
23. Nic Paget-Clarke, Interview with Dr. Luis Macas of CONAIE (The Confederation of Indigenous 
Nationalities of Ecuador), In Motion Mag. (June 6, 2008), http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/global/
lm_int_eng.html#Anchor-Thousands-44867 (“The Quechua, we have been here for four thousand 
years; the Chachis; the Shuar, they are in Amazonía, in the forest area: this historic process has made us 
into a people, a nation.”); see also David J. Wilson, Indigenous South Americans of the Past and 
Present: An Ecological Perspective 170 (1998) (estimating that people have been living in the 
Amazon Basin for over 11,000 years).
24. Approximately 90% of the world’s remaining biodiversity is concentrated in tropical and subtropical 
regions within developing countries, mostly located in the southern hemisphere. See Global Exchange, 
Biopiracy: A New Threat to Indigenous Rights and Culture in Mexico (2001), available at 
http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/mexico/biopiracy.pdf.
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Federacíon Interprovincial de Centros Shuar (the “Federation”),25 which was officially 
recognized by the government of Ecuador in 1964.26 The Federation is charged with 
overseeing “Shuar political, economic, cultural, and juridical interests, and holds regular 
assemblies where representatives from all internal regions of the Shuar participate in 
policymaking and electing officials” to an elected body known as the Shuar directiva 
(the “Directive”), which acts in executive and administrative capacities.27 Central to the 
Shuar’s well-being, survival, and cultural interests is the confirmation of the juridical 
title to their lands, which have never been subject to alien conquest or control.28
 Today, as never before, there is “intense pressure and competition to [extinguish] 
the Shuar culture to . . . marginalize its political leadership” and gain absolute control 
over the resources that comprise the Shuar territory.29 These resources include mineral 
resources and petroleum, as well as ethnobotanical resources in the form of Traditional 
Knowledge about how to put the flora and fauna of the rainforest to good use.30 The 
Shuar now defend their territory with determination and an unyielding commitment to 
maintain control over their cultural identity, economic patrimony, and political future.31
 The current concern for the control of the Shuar lands has been implicated by the 
gross and malicious dereliction of responsibility by foreign petroleum interests that 
are polluting the Amazon Basin as a normal aspect of oil prospecting and 
production.32 Staggering levels of ecological damage are being inflicted on indigenous 
communities by irresponsible corporate behavior.33 Evidence suggests that adverse 
health impacts have been felt throughout the region.34 The Shuar are thus skeptical 
25. See Winston P. Nagan et al., Misappropriation of Shuar Traditional Knowledge (TK) and Trade Secrets: A 
Case Study on BioPiracy in the Amazon, 15 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 9, 45 (2010).
26. Id. at 45–46.
27. Id. at 46.
28. Id. at 12–13.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 13.
31. See id. at 12, 46.
32. See id. at 12.
33. See, e.g., Dan Collyns, Oil Industry ‘Devastating’ for Amazon Communities, Warns UN Rapporteur, The 
Guardian (Dec. 20, 2013, 12:11 EST), http://gu.com/p/3ycnf/tw (reporting on findings of the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights that extractive industries—oil in particular—are causing 
serious environmental problems in the Amazon Basin, which is adversely affecting indigenous peoples 
and the land on which they reside).
34. See, e.g., David Hill, Indigenous Peruvians Protest State Oil Company Taking Over Their Land, The 
Guardian (June 7, 2013, 9:20 EDT), http://gu.com/p/3gc93/tw (exploring indigenous concerns about 
extractives concessions and their impact in the northern Peruvian Amazon); Annie Murphy, Toll of Oil 
Drilling Felt in Peru’s Amazon Basin, Nat’l Pub. Radio (June 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127992348 (exploring the possible adverse health effects of oil 
extraction on indigenous communities in the Peruvian Amazon); Miguel San Sebastián & Juan 
Antonio Córdoba, “Yana Curi” Report: The Impact of Oil Development on the Health of 
the People of the Ecuadorian Amazon (1999), available at http://texacotoxico.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/01/yanacuri_eng_1999.pdf (arguing that an oil extraction operation in San Carlos, 
Ecuador has had a negative impact on the health of people in the community).
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of the presence of corporate actors in and near their territory, particularly in light of 
the adverse impacts of so many concessionary agreements, which have affected 
indigenous communities in the region.
 B. The Civil Law and the Shuar’s Land Ownership
 In the civil law tradition—the legal foundation across Latin America35—the 
concept of ownership (dominium) of a thing is, from a comparative law perspective, a 
concept that resists the fractionalization of property interests.36 Historically, the 
patrician class maintained its status as a political class because of the economic 
foundation that supported it. That foundation was land. As such, the expropriation of 
land, or interests in land, served as an effective method through which the executive 
authority was able to weaken potential, and actual, political opponents. The civil law 
therefore embodied a strong concept of ownership, and only grudgingly permitted the 
splintering or fractionalizing of interests in a thing (res).37 Indeed, this concept of 
ownership in the civil law has been called absolutist or “inviolable.”38 This absolutism 
or inviolability is reflected in a Roman law maxim: Nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam 
ipse habet (“No one can transfer a greater right than he himself has”). Put another way, 
nemo dat quod non habet (“no one gives what he does not have”).
 The civil law often provided an indication of the completeness of ownership 
through the notion that one has rights ius utendi fruendi abutendi (“the right to use 
and enjoy the fruits of [owned property]”). This, at least, provides an indication of 
how far one might exercise one’s “right” of ownership. The concept of “title” in civil 
law, a matter of vital importance to Shuar land ownership rights, is thought to be 
absolute. In practice, this means that the Shuar’s right of ownership is not only better 
than any competing right, but that it is the best and only right of its kind. Regarding 
the concept of ownership in classical civil law, Barry Nicholas, a leading Oxford 
authority on Roman law, concluded:
The absoluteness of Roman ownership can, perhaps, be better seen in what we 
have called its inviolability—in the principle that a man cannot lose ownership 
without his consent, with its corollary that a man cannot pass a better title than 
he has. We have seen that the only exception to this principle of inviolability 
was prescription, and that even that was a very limited exception . . . .39
35. See generally John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal 
Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (3d ed. 2007).
36. See J. Coleman, Property and Poverty, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought 
c.350–c.1450, at 614 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988) (discussing civil law concept of dominium, including its 
indivisibility and superiority to rights had by lesser parties).
37. See Adam Smith, Of Wages and Profit in the Different Employments of Labour and Stock, in An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, at I.10.67 (Edwin Cannan ed., 5th ed. 
1904) (“The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other 
property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable.”).
38. See id.
39. See Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 157 (1962).
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Richard William Leage, another authority on the civil law, explained the foundations 
of the concept of ownership, or dominium, in the classical civil law:
Ownership is an idea that seems to be natural in social man and one that law 
will recognize and protect. It is a relationship between a person and a thing—
the relationship that is expressed in terms of “mine” and “yours” (“meum” and 
“tuum”). In an early community what a man captures or land that he clears and 
cultivates will be accepted as his, and until society grows more complex he has 
more to fear from naked aggression than from mistakes or secret takings. 
When it does become more complex, the law has to lay down criteria for 
recognizing ownership and protecting it. For recognition the law will insist 
upon some ground (or title, as lawyers would say) for ascribing ownership to the 
claimant—e.g. capture, transfer on sale, gift, inheritance. As will be seen, 
however, the law will always tend to presume ownership in the person who is in 
actual control of the property, and so ownership will usually come into question 
before the law in claims of property which another possesses.40
It is clear that the civil law was developed to protect dominium, to protect the potestas 
(“power”) of the dominus (“master”).
 Central to the problem of the title to ownership of the Shuar territory is the 
history of colonization of the territory itself. First, the territory did not succumb to 
naked aggression; it was never colonized. Hence, the questions of whether and how 
state law was justly constituted and how civil law applies, remain. Second, although 
the state and other actors have attempted secret deals and subterfuge to deprive the 
Shuar of their ownership rights, those efforts have never succeeded. The Shuar have 
consistently occupied their traditional lands and have never conceded those lands to 
anyone else. In short, nothing diminishes the dominium of the Shuar over lands they 
have possessed and occupied for over four thousand years.
 The Ecuadorian government claims that the Shuar have no dominium and only 
possess occupancy rights to the land’s surface under the civil law.41 All resources under 
the ground, the government claims, belong to the state.42 But no constitutional 
provision for this notion existed in Ecuador’s 183043 or 1998 Constitution.44 Moreover, 
there is no legislative enactment, nor any specific administrative decree lawfully 
promulgated, that makes such a claim. Indeed, the only legal basis for such a claim 
rests on an assumption that the civil law divides dominium between interests above the 
ground and those under it.
40. Richard William Leage, Roman Private Law 157 (1961).
41. See Kristin Hite, Back to the Basics: Improved Property Rights Can Help Save Ecuador’s Rainforest, 16 Geo. 
Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 763, 781 (2004).
42. See U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Econ. & Bus. Affairs, 2013 Investment Climate Statement—
Ecuador (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204634.htm.
43. See Constitución Política de la República de Ecuador de 1830, Sept. 23, 1830 [hereinafter 1830 
Constitution], available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador30.html.
44. See Constitución Política de la República de Ecuador de 1998, June 5, 1998 [hereinafter 1998 
Constitution], available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador98.html.
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 Anthony Honoré, Regius Professor of Roman Law Emeritus at the University of 
Oxford and a Fellow of All Souls College, provides the following opinion of a 
modern juris consult:
The civil law does not distinguish so far as ownership of land is concerned 
between what is above and below ground. The operative phrase is “quae solo 
continentur” (D.6.1.1.1), which includes what grows on the land (trees, crops) 
and what is found beneath it. However many states either through the 
constitution or a practice in making grants of land or a statute reserve to 
themselves or to a body controlled by them mineral rights. There must, 
however, be a specific instrument that does this. Of course contracts often 
confer mineral rights on a specified person or corporation. Such rights must be 
exercised with due regard for the rights of the surface owner. But such rights 
cannot be derived from the civilian common law on its own. The owner of land 
owns it usque ad caelum and usque ad inferos (to the sky and the underworld).45
In light of the fundamental principles of ownership in the civil law, particularly the 
well-established principles of absolutism and inviolability, there is no assumption or 
practice that permits the encroachment on the civil law concept of dominium. There 
is no legislation or constitutional basis (nor any other lawful statement) which holds, 
in contrast to the mandate of the civil law, that the state owns the subsurface 
resources located under the Shuar territory.
 C. The Legal Position of the Shuar Under the 1998 and 2008 Constitutions
 The 1830 Constitution of Ecuador codified a paternalistic pupilage model, which 
meant that the Shuar would have inchoate rights in theory, but no rights in practice. As 
a matter of constitutional law, this was thoroughly hypocritical and deceptive. The 
1830 Constitution provided the moral cover for this deception; it subordinated the 
constitutional and legal status of the Shuar to parish priests who were to serve as their 
“tutors” and “fathers.”46
 However, as later constitutions were promulgated, this strictly paternalistic pupilage 
model changed. For example, the 1998 Constitution guaranteed collective rights for 
indigenous peoples, including the right to ownership and management of their ancestral 
lands.47 The 1998 Constitution also entrenched the right to equality under the law48 
and required the state to protect such rights.49 The 1998 Constitution further stipulated 
that ordinary law may not restrict the exercise of constitutional rights and guarantees,50 
which included a general recognition of ownership rights.51 It should also be noted that 
45. Document on file with author.
46. 1830 Constitution, supra note 43, art. 68.
47. 1998 Constitution, supra note 44, art. 84.
48. Id. arts. 1–2.
49. Id. art. 16.
50. Id. arts. 18, 23(6).
51. Id. art. 30.
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the 1998 Constitution did not include any provision for expropriation or the division of 
property interests above and below the ground.52 Even the 1830 Constitution stipulated: 
“[N]o one shall be deprived of his property, nor his property be subject to any public 
use without his consent and without receiving just compensation as judged by the 
standard of a good man.”53 This provision, in its own terms, did not provide any 
indication that the “pupils,” their “tutors,” or their “fathers” could be precluded from 
constitutional protection. Indeed, this provision is so fundamental, and so consistent 
with a natural law tradition, that it is unlikely that such an explicit protection applied 
to only some of the citizens of Ecuador and not to the indigenous people and their 
tutors. As such, the term “no one” in the 1830 Constitution must be read as inclusive 
in the absence of any other objective meaning to the contrary. Of course, the phrase 
“no one” would have to be reconciled with other articles of the 1830 Constitution, 
which treated indigenous people as being in a state of pupilage with church guardians.54 
Yet even in light of the denigrating nature of this model, it cannot be assumed that 
under both the natural law tradition and the values of the Catholic Church that either 
the guardians or their indigenous pupils are to be excluded from the phrase “no one.”
 The rights of attached dominium of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians are further 
developed in the 1998 Constitution in a section entitled “Collective Rights.” 
Collective dominium over traditional lands and the lands of Afro-Ecuadorians was 
further strengthened by the stipulation that such lands cannot be acquired by 
outsiders on the basis of acquisitive prescription.55 This is established in modern civil 
law systems, and was integrated into the 2008 Constitution in a section entitled 
“Rights of Communities, Peoples and Nations.”56
 Critically, the 1998 and 2008 Constitutions enhanced the indivisibility and 
inviolability of dominium over traditional lands through their specific use of the 
classical Roman law approach.57 In fact, the classical Roman law approach asserting 
the absolutism of dominium is not only applied by these constitutions, it is actually 
extended. Under their provisions, traditional lands are exempt from property tax and 
can be transferred without any charges.58 Indeed, these constitutional provisions 
support the strongest possible view of the inviolability and absoluteness of the 
dominium of the Shuar. More than that, this legal construction, building upon the 
classical Roman law of the indivisibility of dominium, demolishes any asserted claim 
that the state or Ecuadorian law actually permits or promotes the divisibility of 
52. See generally id.
53. 1830 Constitution, supra note 43, art. 62.
54. Compare id. art. 62, with id. arts. 9–13.
55. 1998 Constitution, supra note 44, art. 84(2)–(3).
56. Constitución Política de la República de Ecuador de 2008, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 57 [hereinafter 
2008 Constitution], available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html.
57. See 1998 Constitution, supra note 44, art. 84; 2008 Constitution, supra note 56, art. 57.
58. See generally 1998 Constitution, supra note 44; 2008 Constitution, supra note 56.
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dominium. Such a claim regarding the Shuar territory is clearly without foundation 
under both the law of Ecuador and the civil law tradition on which it is founded.
 This does not deny the power of the state (imperium) to declare a right of public 
utility over parts of indigenous lands, which is enshrined in both the 1998 and 2008 
Constitutions.59 Moreover, the corpus of Ecuadorian civil law holds that the state has 
interests in all lands within the boundaries of Ecuador if that land does not have 
another owner (i.e., if that land is terra nullius).60 However, indigenous ownership of 
traditional lands is “unalienable, immune from seizure and indivisible” under the 2008 
Constitution.61 Thus, in light of the public health and environmental consequences of 
extracting natural resources, the question remains as to where a constitutionally 
compliant expropriation threshold should be.62
 Other sources of Ecuadorian law may help to clarify the actual scope of Shuar 
ownership of their traditional lands in light of the looming threat of expropriation by 
the state. In addition to the Ecuadorian civil law,63 the right to ownership of indigenous 
land is also governed by special laws; these include the Law on Uncultivated Land and 
Settlement,64 and two laws that provide some protections to the Shuar: the Mining 
Law of 199165 and the Environmental Regulations for Mining Activities.66
 The Law on Uncultivated Land and Settlement is important because it defines 
“tierras baldías” (“uncultivated land”), and describes what ownership entails, including 
ownership by indigenous communities.67 Under this law, “[c]ommunitarian land of 
ancestral possession of indigenous people who define themselves as ‘nations’ of ancestral 
roots . . . as well as communities that form part of these collectivities . . . shall not be 
considered as uncultivated land (Tierras Baldías).”68 Anything else may be considered 
59. See 1998 Constitution, supra note 44, art. 84(2); 2008 Constitution, supra note 56, art. 323.
60. See 2008 Constitution, supra note 56, art. 264; see also, e.g., Decreto Supremo No. 2172, Ley de Tierras 
Baldías y Colonización [Law on Uncultivated Land and Settlement], Registro Oficial [R.O.], 28 Sept. 
1964; Decreto Supremo No. 2753, Ley de Tierras Baldías y Colonización [Law on Uncultivated Land and 
Settlement], Registro Oficial [R.O.], 6 Jan. 1966; Decreto Supremo No. 196, Ley Especial Para 
Adjudicación de Tierras Baldias en la Amazonia [Special Law on Adjudicating Uncultivated Land in the 
Amazon Rainforest], Registro Oficial [R.O.], 17 Feb. 1972; Decreto Supremo No. 2091, Ley de 
Colonización de la Región Amazonica [Law on the Settlement of the Amazon Rainforest], Registro 
Oficial [R.O.], 12 Jan. 1978 [collectively hereinafter Supreme Decrees]. 
61. 2008 Constitution, supra note 56, art. 57(4).
62. See infra Part IV.B; 2008 Constitution, supra note 56, arts. 424–25 (“The Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land and prevails over any other legal regulatory framework.”).
63. See, e.g., Supreme Decrees, supra note 60; 2008 Constitution, supra note 56.
64. Ley No. 2004–03, Codificación de la Ley de Tierras Baldías y Colonización [Codification of the Law 
on Uncultivated Land and Settlement], Registro Oficial [R.O.], 16 Apr. 2004 [hereinafter 2004 
Codification].
65. Ley No. 126, Ley de Mineria [Mining Law], Registro Oficial [R.O.], 31 May 1991.
66. Decreto Ejectutivo No. 625, Reglamento Ambiental Para Actividades Mineras [Environmental 
Regulations for Mining Activities], Registro Oficial [R.O.], 12 Sept. 1997.
67. See generally 2004 Codification, supra note 64.
68. Id. art. 1(4).
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“uncultivated land” such that ownership would fall to the country’s National Institute 
of Agricultural Development (INDA) and more generally, to the state.69
 Under the Law on Uncultivated Land and Settlement, if ownership of tierras 
baldías was transferred or acquired under the governing law of the 1920s and 1930s, 
or through any other manner, that ownership may be extinguished and, as a result, 
the INDA may dispose of such lands freely.70 While this law qualifies the meaning 
of “extinction of ownership” rights, it also indicates which activities do not constitute 
“cultivation,” thus creating the possibility that a previously existing right of ownership 
may be extinguished.71 Before ownership of certain lands is extinguished, the law 
provides the owner with the opportunity to present its ownership title.72 Notably, 
however, these procedures and mechanisms are administrative; there is no mention 
of a court of law.73
 These procedures arguably represent a prima facie political objective to oust the 
normal courts of law from the process, thus increasing the chance that any abuse will 
go unpunished. As such, the procedural mechanisms instituted by the Law on 
Uncultivated Land and Settlement reflect the state’s effort to circumvent the 1998 
and 2008 Constitutions, which importantly provide that the constitution takes 
precedence over any other law or regulation produced at any level of government in 
the event of a conflict among sources of legal authority.74
 The 1998 and 2008 Constitutions add that “the courts, tribunals, judges and 
administrative authorities are compelled to apply the pertinent norms of the 
Constitution, even if the interested party does not expressly invoke the Constitution.”75 
Clearly, any legislation or administrative action contrary to the Ecuadorian 
Constitution and which undermines the rule of law under the constitution is invalid 
on its face.76 While this does not directly impact the dominium of the Shuar, it is 
important to note that the 1998 and 2008 Constitutions operate to specifically 
mandate and compel the protection of the dominium over traditional lands.
 When examining the question of the dominium of indigenous people over their 
traditional lands, two facts are without dispute. First, the Ecuadorian Constitution 
69. Id.
70. Id. arts. 1(2)–(3).
71. Id. arts. 2–3.
72. Id. arts. 34–35.
73. See id.
74. 1998 Constitution, supra note 44, art. 272; 2008 Constitution, supra note 56, art. 425 (“The order 
of precedence for the application of the regulations shall be as follows: the Constitution; international 
treaties and conventions; organic laws; regular laws; regional regulations and district ordinances; decrees 
and regulations; ordinances; agreements and resolutions; and the other actions and decisions taken by 
public authorities. In the event of any conflict between regulations from different hierarchical levels, the 
Constitutional Court, judges, administrative authorities and public servants, it shall be settled by the 
application of the standard of higher order of precedence.”).
75. 1998 Constitution, supra note 44, art. 273; 2008 Constitution, supra note 56, art. 426.
76. See 1998 Constitution, supra note 44; 2008 Constitution, supra note 56.
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protects the ownership of such land and recognizes the inviolability and absoluteness 
of the Shuar’s dominium. Second, despite legislative efforts to weaken the ability of 
the Shuar to protect their ownership rights in courts of law, Ecuadorian legislation 
specifically affirms these rights. In fact, the legislature has tried to make it more 
difficult for corrupt administrators to undermine the constitutional and economic 
rights of indigenous people. It has passed new legislation that entrenches indigenous 
land rights in constitutional terms and declares the supremacy of the constitution.77 
By its terms, this legislation should curtail the unlawful expropriation of indigenous 
land. Yet the new legislation threatens the Shuar’s rights by leaving the key term 
“cultivation” undefined and ambiguous. Which activities constitute cultivation and 
which do not? Is the right to own land now dependent on its “cultivation”? Can the 
owner no longer deal with his property as he wishes? Does the concept of dominium 
(as expressed in Article 618 of the Ecuadorian Civil Code) still have the same 
meaning or has it been watered down?
 In sum, the protection provided by the Ecuadorian Constitution is not absolute; 
through ingenious mechanisms, creeping or disguised expropriation are real 
possibilities. These efforts are driven by the economic value that the Shuar land and 
the land of other indigenous communities hold—their rich biodiversity provides not 
only mineral wealth but also the basis for Traditional Knowledge in healing and 
cultural medicine.
 D. International Law and the Traditional Lands of the Shuar
 In 1977, the Republic of Ecuador ratified the American Convention on Human 
Rights.78 As a result, Ecuador is legally bound to respect and promote the rights 
codified in this instrument.79 In Mayanga Awas Tingni Community, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights ruled that the provisions of the Convention 
directly applied to Nicaragua because Nicaragua ratified the Convention.80 The 
court also focused upon the question of the land rights of the Mayanga Awas Tingni 
community, and the extent to which state infringement of those rights would be a 
violation of human rights law under the Convention.81 Thus, this decision makes it 
clear that the Convention’s obligations concerning indigenous communities’ title to 
and ownership of the land are human rights obligations.
77. Compare 2008 Constitution, supra note 56, arts. 57, 83–85 (granting indigenous land rights in 
constitutional terms and declaring the supremacy of the Constitution), with 2004 Codification, supra 
note 64, art. 1(4) (considering indigenous lands as part of the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario 
[National Institute of Agricultural Development]).
78. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
79. See id.
80. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
81. Id.
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 These obligations are treaty obligations and are binding on all states that are a 
party to the treaty. Article 21 of the Convention stipulates that:
1.  Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law 
may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.
2.  No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just 
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the 
cases and according to the forms established by law.
3.  Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be 
prohibited by law.82
The provisions protecting property are self-evident. Notably, the word “property” is not 
preceded by the word “private,” and such an omission is not made elsewhere in the 
Convention. This was ostensibly a deliberate omission. Instead, the Convention’s 
drafters established that everyone has the right to use and enjoy his property.83 While 
the state may subordinate such use to the social interest, omitting the “private” aspect 
of property in this context was meant to denote all property—not just private interests.
 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that Article 21 of the 
Convention “protects the right to property in a sense which includes, among others, 
the rights of members of indigenous communities within the framework of communal 
property.”84 As discussed below, traditional property is protected and recognized in 
the Constitution of Ecuador.85 It is clear that the hard law of human rights of the 
Inter-American system clearly provides specific protection for the traditional title 
and ownership rights of the Shuar people in their land.86
 In 1989, the International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169, but was not effective until 1991.87 This 
treaty was designed to consolidate preexisting ILO instruments and developments in 
international human rights law for the specific purpose of protecting and enhancing 
the political, cultural, economic, and territorial rights, titles, and resources of the 
indigenous peoples of the world.88 The Republic of Ecuador ratified this treaty in 
82. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 78, art. 21 (emphasis added). 
83. See id.
84. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 148.
85. See infra Part III.E.
86. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OAS.Ser.L/V/
II.96, doc. 10, rev. 1, chap. IX (Apr. 24, 1997), available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/ecuador-
eng/index%20-%20ecuador.htm.
87. See Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 
27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169]. 
88. See Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Including the Right to Development, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/9/9, at 11 (Aug. 
11, 2008) (by S. James Anaya) (“A momentous step in the consolidation of the contemporary 
international regime on indigenous peoples, Convention No. 169 provides significant recognition of 
indigenous peoples’ collective rights in key areas, including cultural integrity; consultation and 
891
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
1998.89 Unfortunately, state officials found a word in the treaty that could be used to 
disparage the rights of the First Nations of Ecuador, including the Shuar. That word 
was “consult” as found in Article 15 of the treaty, which states:
1.  The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to 
their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the right 
of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation 
of these resources.
2.  In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface 
resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall 
establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these 
peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their 
interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any 
programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining 
to their lands. The peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in 
the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any 
damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities.90
This provision requires the government to consult indigenous peoples before attempting 
to exploit their subsurface natural resources. But the Ecuadorian Constitution gives 
complete title to the indigenous people of Ecuador. Moreover, the constitution does 
nothing to change the civil law basis of the First Nations’ titles to their territory. The 
civil law maintains that title to land is inviolable.91 As a consequence, the government 
has no right to consult regarding the dominium that the Shuar and other indigenous 
peoples hold over their traditional lands. The Ecuadorian government cannot enter 
into concessionary agreements, contracts, or similar arrangements. These powers are 
vested only in the political authority of the communities that may be affected by such 
an undertaking.
 Article 15 of the treaty also addresses the right of indigenous peoples to participate 
in the use, management, and conservation of their natural resources through specific 
reference to “their lands.”92 This provision requires that “their lands” be “specially 
safeguarded,” and refers to cases in which states claim that they retain “ownership” over 
mineral or subsurface resources.93 The provision dictates that, in those circumstances, 
participation; self-government and autonomy; land, territory and resource rights; and non-discrimination 
in the social and economic spheres.”).
89. Ratification of C169—Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, Int’l Lab, http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2014).
90. ILO Convention 169, supra note 87, art. 15 (emphasis added).
91. See Dig. 6.1.1.1 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 16). 
92. ILO Convention 169, supra note 87, art. 15(1).
93. Id. art. 15(2).
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such a claim is limited.94 Thus, the government can only use, manage, or conserve 
these resources by respecting indigenous peoples’ right to participate in those activities.95
 In addition, this treaty provision only refers to those lands in which the 
government has legal title to subsurface resources. But as discussed above, there is 
nothing in Ecuadorian law that gives the government any legal title to the subsurface 
resources of any of the Shuar’s or other First Nations’ traditional lands.96 In 1998, the 
notion that the state could rely on this treaty provision to claim the right to 
expropriate subsurface rights over traditional territories of all the First Nations of 
Ecuador is completely inconsistent with the clear text and purpose of Article 15 and 
the treaty itself. However, this treaty maintains the government’s obligation to 
protect indigenous communities and their lands from exploitation and spoliation, 
and to ensure the survival and development of these communities in an ecologically 
responsible manner. The government must do this in partnership with the 
communities themselves. In fulfilling these obligations, the state must establish clear 
procedures to protect against theft or capricious governmental action to expropriate 
the rights of First Nations. One way to do this would be to establish procedures in 
accordance with the American Convention on Human Rights.97
 In 1977, Ecuador ratified the American Convention on Human Rights without 
reservation and the government recognized it as a legitimate instrument of international 
law.98 Article 2 of the Convention provides:
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is 
not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties 
undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the 
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.99
 This provision is designed to ensure the availability of an effective legal remedy 
to all persons under a state’s jurisdiction who claim a violation of their fundamental 
rights, the nonexistence of which clearly violates the Convention. Further, it is 
insufficient that a state establishes, in its constitution or laws, a basic procedure to 
seek redress; the procedure “must be truly effective in determining whether there has 
been a violation of human rights and [in] providing the means to remedy it.”100 In 
developing these procedures, a state may not interpret any treaty provision in a 
manner that would allow any person “to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the 
94. Id. 
95. See id. art. 15(1).
96. See supra Part III.B–C.
97. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 78.
98. Ecuador, Org. of Am. States, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_American_Convention_on_
Human_Rights_sign.htm#Ecuador (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
99. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 78, art. 2.
100. Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 69, ¶ 164 (Aug. 18, 2000).
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rights and freedoms recognized in this [Convention] or to restrict them to a greater 
extent than is provided” by the Convention.101 According to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, this precludes a restrictive interpretation by any state that 
would dilute the rights of members of indigenous communities within the framework 
of traditional property.102
 The court also recognized that, among First Nations, there is a traditional form 
of collective property ownership that is the center of the community as a whole.103 
Further, the court explained that indigenous “relations to the land are not merely a 
matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they 
must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
generations.”104 These principles ref lect international norms of interpretation 
regarding indigenous property rights, and any state action that would infringe upon 
or dilute these rights is expressly forbidden by the Convention.105 Concessionary 
agreements with unscrupulous corporations and exploitative contracts simply do not 
comport with these principles and seek to diminish the dominium of the Shuar over 
their land. International law and human rights protect the right of ownership of 
Shuar traditional lands by the Shuar and for the Shuar.
 E. Sources of Shuar Law and Shuar Land Ownership
 In 2002, the Shuar Federation adopted a Bill of Fundamental Rights that 
clarified their rights to their lands, properties, and other related interests.106 The 
Shuar’s Bill of Fundamental Rights was based on four notions embodied by the text 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, namely that: (1) its 
clarifications were unequivocal; (2) they owned the land; (3) they owned everything 
101. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 78, art. 29(b).
102. See, e.g., Pueblo Saramaka v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007); Sawhoyamaxa Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005); Moiwana 
Cmty. v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 
(June 15, 2005); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
103. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b) (“States shall provide 
effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: . . . Any action which has the aim or effect of 
dispossessing [indigenous peoples] of their lands, territories or resources”); id. art. 27 (concerning 
independent, impartial processes for recognition and adjudication of rights pertaining to land and 
resources); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, opened for signature Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language.”); Anni Äärelä & Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, Hum. 
Rts. Comm., Communication No. 779/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (Oct. 24, 2001).
106. Bill of Fundamental Rights (2002) (Shuar Fed’n, Ecuador).
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above and below the land; and (4) they owned their Traditional Knowledge and 
culture.107 To ensure that none of these resources could be stolen, the Shuar created 
the Shuar National Corporation. By vesting these rights in the Corporation, the 
Shuar Federation sought to assure the Shuar people that their assets could not be 
taken away from them on the basis that the state did not know what the Shuar’s 
rights of ownership really were.
 The document declaring the fundamental rights of the Shuar must be read in light 
of the full analysis of the legal principles applicable to the ownership rights of the 
Shuar presented above.108 Recall that the historic title to the Shuar land vests in the 
Shuar.109 The civil law provides the Shuar with additional protection by requiring the 
protection and inviolability of the Shuar’s ownership over their historic lands.110 The 
1830 Constitution, although describing the First Nations of Ecuador as miserable, 
nonetheless did not expropriate Shuar land and, in fact, provided a certain degree of 
natural law protection for it under the tutelage of the Catholic Church.111 Finally, the 
1998 and 2008 Ecuadorian Constitutions provide stronger protection for the 
fundamental rights of the Shuar to maintain lawful title and ownership of their land.112
 The relationship between indigenous peoples and their patrimonial land 
ownership is crucial for indigenous communities and their partners; it provides 
insight as to how broader issues of group dominance and group subjugation in the 
Latin American indigenous context may be confronted.113 Moreover, the recognition 
and observation of that relationship necessarily presents an opportunity to attempt to 
achieve a more accurate understanding of what “indigeneity” actually means.114 As 
107. See generally id.
108. See supra Part III.A–D.
109. See supra Part III.A–D.
110. See supra Part III.B.
111. See supra Part III.C.
112. See supra Part III.C.
113. See Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell & Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World 
Public Order 521–60 (1980). For useful analyses of group deprivations, see Winston P. Nagan & 
Vivile F. Rodin, Racism, Genocide, and Mass Murder: Toward a Legal Theory About Group Deprivations, 17 
Nat’l Black L.J. 133 (2004); Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Sexual Identity as Personhood: Towards an 
Expressive Liberty in the Military Context, 84 N.D. L. Rev. 175 (2008).
114. For a lengthy period, one working understanding of “indigeneity” stood out above the rest: that of José 
Martínez Cobo, a special rapporteur appointed in 1971 by the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations. See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 
(2009). This definition of “indigenous” was essentially comprised of four monothetic characteristics: (1) 
descendants of the original inhabitants, (2) of conquered territories, (3) possessing a minority culture, and 
(4) recognizing themselves as such. See id. at 4–5. More specifically, Special Rapporteur Martínez Cobo set 
out the following criteria, which became the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations’ working 
definition of “indigenous” until the late 1990s:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those 
territories, or parts of them. They form, at present, non-dominant sectors of society and 
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indicated, important and long-awaited inroads have been made. In 2007, the launch 
of the U.N. Declaration of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights provided a new global 
platform for international collaboration between indigenous peoples, national 
governments, and international organizations. These international organizations 
include traditionally apolitical development organizations, some of which have 
changed course from a “do no harm” approach to a more proactive “do good” 
approach in regional and local operations that impact indigenous peoples and their 
ownership of patrimonial land.115
iV.  thE shUar natiOn, thE QUEstiOn Of intELLECtUaL prOpErtY, and thE 
rEaLitiEs Of biOprOspECting
 Further complicating the Shuar’s land ownership concerns are incursions onto their 
patrimonial land for biodiversity prospecting, or “bioprospecting.” Bioprospectors’ 
interest in the Amazon Basin, particularly the territory of the Shuar, stems from the 
continuing lack of holistic data concerning Amazonian biota. They are thus drawn to 
opportunities to “discover” novel compounds or organisms that have potential 
pharmacological or biotechnological use and the Traditional Knowledge of indigenous 
societies concerning the identification, use, and medicinal effect of these compounds 
or organisms. The Shuar consider the biodiversity of their territory to be vitally 
important to their cultural heritage, with particular regard to the accumulated 
Traditional Knowledge possessed and still used by the Shuar to heal the sick, cultivate 
are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions, and legal systems.
 See Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Populations, The Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations, Comm’n on Hum. Rts, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (Mar. 11, 1986) 
(by José Martínez Cobo). By now, it is known that the Shuar have lived on largely the same territory in 
southeastern Ecuador for millennia and are descendants of the original inhabitants of the geography they 
currently inhabit (between the upper mountains of the Andes and the Amazonian lowlands between the 
Pastaza and Marañón Rivers), but what if they had only arrived in their current location in relatively recent 
history, like the Maasai people, an indigenous group in East Africa which was forcibly evicted by British 
colonial forces from much of their patrimonial land a century ago? See Maa Speaking Communities of 
Kenya, Memorandum on the Anglo-Maasai Agreements: A Case of Historical and Contemporary 
Injustices and the Dispossession of the Maasai Land, Presentation to the Office of the President of the 
Republic of Kenya et al. (Aug. 13, 2004) (on file with authors). Does geographic relocation, which renders 
the descendancy criterion moot, somehow render indigeneity forfeit? Plus, the Shuar are among the only 
indigenous groups in Latin America which have not been conquered by national forces or outside colonial 
powers. See Steven Rubenstein & Alejandro Tsakimp: A Shuar Healer in the Margins of 
History 52 (2002). What does being conquered have to do with being indigenous? It is an unfortunate 
and common phenomenon, but certainly not a meaningful descriptive criterion. Further efforts to improve 
upon these criteria were made by a subsequent Chairperson-Rapporteur of the U.N. Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations, Professor Erica-Irene A. Daes, who, despite advising against the use of set 
criteria, did consider some to be conceptually relevant to defining indigeneity. See supra note 21.
115. See World Bank Operations Evaluation Dep’t, Implementation of Operational Directive 
4.20 on Indigenous Peoples: An Independent Desk Review 2–3 (2003) (reviewing projects 
developed under the guidelines of Operational Directive 4.20, a recommendation of which was to 
“distinguish clearly between the safeguard (do no harm) aspects of the [Operational Directive] and its 
do good aspects”).
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certain plant species, bring about religious epiphanies, and much more.116 The Shuar 
have been targeted by bioprospectors because their Traditional Knowledge is invaluable 
for targeting plants and plant combinations that have led to the identification of new 
and diverse compounds with pharmaceutical, and therefore medical and commercial, 
value.117
 While the term “bioprospector” is relatively new, the phenomenon it describes is 
not.118 Medical researchers and practitioners, particularly pharmacologists and 
pharmacognosists, have long been in the business of deriving therapeutic agents from 
rainforest biota; more than 120 pharmaceutical products currently on the market 
include primary active agents derived from plants, half of which came from rainforest 
botanicals, and more than 75% of which were discovered by studying plants used by 
indigenous societies in traditional medicine.119 While these products have certainly 
helped countless people, it is also important to recognize that the marketing and selling 
of plant-derived pharmaceuticals is a lucrative business. It has been estimated that the 
top twenty best-selling pharmaceuticals on the market today are derived from tropical 
plants, and are worth up to $6 billion in yearly sales.120 By 2000, global sales of naturally 
derived or herbal medicines were also estimated at $30 billion per year.121 For these 
reasons, certain individuals are motivated to search for biodiverse genetic material in 
nature; these are the bioprospectors.122 From Christopher Columbus to Richard 
116. See generally John Perkins et al., Spirit of the Shuar: Wisdom from the Last Unconquered 
People of the Amazon (2001).
117. See generally Craig Hammer, Juan-Carlos Jintiach & Ricardo Tsakimp, Practical Developments in Law, 
Science, and Policy: Efforts to Protect the Traditional Group Knowledge and Practices of the Shuar, an Indigenous 
People of the Ecuadorian Amazon, 46 Pol’y Sci. 125, 125–41 (2013) [hereinafter Practical Developments].
118. See Calestous Juma, The Gene Hunters: Biotechnology and the Scramble for Seeds 38 (1989).
119. See Norman R. Farnsworth et al., Medicinal Plants in Therapy, 63 Bull. World Health Org. 965, 
965–81 (1985).
120. See Michael Blakeney, Intellectual Property Aspects of Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, in Economic and 
Social Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology 43 (Robert E. Evenson et al. eds., 2002) (“[I]n 1995 
the estimated market value of pharmaceutical derivatives from indigenous peoples’ traditional medicine 
was US$43 billion worldwide.”); see also Marcy J. Balunas, Drug Discovery from Medicinal Plants, 78 Life 
Sci. 431, 431–41 (2005) (estimating that the twenty best-selling pharmaceuticals are derived from tropical 
plants and sell for a combined total of approximately $6 billion per year); Judith Gradwohl et al., 
Saving the Tropical Forests 50–51 (1988) (“In 1980, the estimated value of plant-derived prescription 
drugs in the United States was $8 billion.”); Bioprospecting/Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples, ETC Group 
(Dec. 26, 1995), http://www.etcgroup.org/content/bioprospectingbiopiracy-and-indigenous-peoples 
(citing Rural Advancement Found. Int’l, Conserving Indigenous Knowledge: Integrating Two 
Systems of Innovation (1994)) (“RAFI estimates that medicinal plants and microbials from the South 
contribute at least $30 billion a year to the North’s pharmaceutical industry.”).
121. Karan Vasisht & Vishjavit Kumar, Trade and Production of Herbal Medicines and Natural 
Health Products (2002); see also Steven R. King et al., Issues in the Commercialization of Medicinal 
Plants, in Responding to Bioprospecting: From Biodiversity in the South to Medicines in the 
North 77, 84 (Hanne Svarstad & Shivcharn S. Dhillion eds., 2000).
122. See Carla Mattix, The Debate over Bioprospecting on the Public Lands, 13 Nat’l Res. & Env’t 528 (1999) 
(referring to bioprospecting as “the search for genetic and biochemical resources in nature”); Edgar 
Asebey & Jill Kempenaar, The Intellectual Property Perspective on Biodiversity: Biodiversity Prospecting: 
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Schultes,123 various personalities have been drawn to bioprospecting out of curiosity, a 
sense of adventure, but primarily for fame and fortune. Unfortunately, efforts to protect 
this knowledge have been challenging. The international community has only recently 
started to develop protections for Traditional Knowledge, and there is a long way to go.
 A. The Shuar’s Traditional Knowledge: A Primer
 Traditional Knowledge is a tightly controlled aspect of Shuar culture.124 The 
particular Traditional Knowledge that serves as the blueprint for countless plant-
derived cures and treatments is highly valued and entrusted only to a small number of 
powerful members of the Shuar indigenous community: shamans.125 Ricardo Tsakimp, 
Chief Shaman for the Shuar Nation and President of the Shaman’s Association of the 
Andes, explains that the Shuar’s Traditional Knowledge has been preserved, cultivated, 
and transmitted from shaman to shaman—or otherwise from shaman to particularized 
members of the Shuar community—for thousands of years.126 To Tsakimp, a Shuar 
shaman’s encyclopedic understanding of the medicinal quality of the surrounding 
biodiversity is something of an organic tool that has been refined and honed over 
generations. He states that the training necessary to become a Shuar shaman is 
rigorous; it implicates material, psychological, and spiritual awareness and 
understanding. He explains that in the Shuar culture, shamans diagnose ailments that 
have physiological, psychological, and mystical causes, including what the Shuar 
understand to be energy imbalances in patients. To execute their responsibilities, 
shamans spend years cultivating their knowledge of thousands of plant species endemic 
to the rainforest to learn precise combinations and dosages to treat or cure scores of 
human ailments. They additionally develop what are otherwise known (in Western 
societies) as comprehensive psychiatric evaluative skills, after which they undergo an 
arduous vetting process to further become a guide in all ways spiritual.
 From the point of view of the Shuar, their very survival is contingent on their ability 
to sustain their cultural practices; they believe that their survival is inextricably linked to 
their dependence on their land and resources because they are crucial components of 
Shuar beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-being, as well as social and economic integrity.127 
This connectivity between people and land has been variously described in recent 
Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 703, 704 n.2 (1995) 
(referring to bioprospecting as “the search for bioactive compounds contained in natural sources”).
123. See Richard Evans Schultes, Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/761765/Richard-Evans-Schultes (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
124. See Practical Developments, supra note 117, at 127–28.
125. See Harner, supra note 20, at 116–25.
126. See Practical Developments, supra note 117, at 127.
127. See id.
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decades as a “land ethic,”128 “environmentalism,”129 and “land stewardship,”130 among 
other designations. The Shuar phrase for this is “nunka iistin wainkiatin,” which roughly 
translated means “to take care of our world.”131 In short, a key goal of the Shuar is to 
develop workable strategies that promote continued, sustainable management and 
protection of Shuar land and resources by members of the Shuar community. On the 
macro level, Shuar leaders and shamans132 have expressed their goal of renewing efforts 
between the Shuar, other indigenous communities, and the international community at 
large to better integrate cultural, spiritual, and social values into environmental 
policymaking.133 In practice, however, the Traditional Knowledge of the Shuar—like 
that of so many other indigenous cultures—faces the critical threat of erosion through 
globalization. As urban-industrial sectors continue to grow and impede on Shuar 
patrimonial land, and mass communication technology becomes increasingly 
sophisticated, Shuar community and spiritual leaders are increasingly concerned about 
protecting their Traditional Knowledge not only from being pirated, but also from being 
forgotten over time.134 Accordingly, another ostensible goal of the Shuar is for them to 
be able to protect their Traditional Knowledge from outside incursion and from 
degradation over time as a result of globalization. Importantly, the Shuar are not 
128. See generally Aldo Leopold, The Land Ethic, in A Sand County Almanac 237 (1966).
129. See generally John Muir, The Yosemite (1912); Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the 
Future of Progressive Politics (1989); Rachel Carson, The Silent Spring (1962).
130. See, e.g., Christopher Bamford, The Heritage of Celtic Christianity: Ecology and Holiness 
(1982); Albert Schweitzer, Reverence for Life (1969); Julian Burger et al., The GAIA Atlas 
of First Peoples: A Future for the Indigenous World (1990).
131. “Wainkiatin” approximates the concept of protection or safeguarding, and “nunka” refers to the natural 
world or Earth.
132. The Shuar word for shaman is “uwishin.”
133. See Practical Developments, supra note 117.
134. See First Global Ministerial Environment Forum, Malmö, Swed., May 29–31, 2000, Malmö Ministerial 
Declaration, para. 18 (May 31, 2000), available at http://www.unep.org/malmo/malmo_ministerial.htm 
(“We must pay special attention to threats to cultural diversity and traditional knowledge, in particular of 
indigenous and local communities, which may be posed by globalization.”); see also Angela Riley, ‘Straight 
Stealing’: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 69, 113–16 (2005) 
(stating that the culture of indigenous peoples is threatened by globalization); Robert Porter, Pursuing the 
Path of Indigenization in the Era of Emergent International Law Governing the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 5 
Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 123, 130 (2002) (discussing the danger posed by “extraordinary forces of 
assimilation” which, for example in the context of the United States, could lead to the “complete absorption 
of Indigenous peoples into American society”). Ethnobotanist Mark Plotkin explains:
There are two major threats to indigenous people of the rainforest. The first is 
acculturation—the draw to western culture, the city, and things of that nature. For 
example, someone may be Mundurucu Indian in genetic terms, but they don’t speak the 
language, know the legends, or know the plants. In short they are not likely to perpetuate 
the culture. Secondly, it’s the destruction of the environment. How can you have a 
rainforest Indian if there’s no rainforest for them to live in? So this idea of “we’ve got to 
preserve the culture” or “we have to preserve the rainforest” is missing the boat. In the 
interest of preserving the rainforest, [Indians] need to preserve cultural diversity. The best 
way to protect ancestral rainforests is . . . [for] Indians [to] hold on to their culture, and the 
best way . . . [for] them hold onto their culture is . . . [for] them [to] protect the rainforest.
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exclusively interested in protectionism, particularly since there is increasing recognition 
among the international community of the practical value of Traditional Knowledge for 
humanity as a whole.135 Shuar political and spiritual leaders are mindful of the significant 
beneficial implications of their Traditional Knowledge on the macro level; they, like 
many other indigenous communities, very much want to contribute to humanity as they 
seek to protect their intellectual property rights over the knowledge itself.136 This might 
include the development of rules governing access to the Shuar’s Traditional Knowledge, 
which could create a process for granting permission to enter Shuar land to sample and 
potentially remove genetic material.
 As mentioned above, the Shuar’s general goals are elegantly articulated by the Bill 
of Fundamental Rights adopted by the Shuar Federation’s Grand Assembly in 2002.137 
The Bill reiterates the goals long held by the Federation, including protecting human 
rights of current and future generations, preserving Shuar identity, advancing Shuar 
community interests such as health care, civil rights, and responsible infrastructure 
development, providing for the inclusion of minority groups, protecting Shuar economic 
self-sufficiency, protecting Shuar land and the environment, and combating exclusion, 
 See Rhett A. Butler, An Interview with Ethnobotanist Dr. Mark Plotkin: Indigenous People Are Key to 
Rainforest Conservation Efforts Says Renowned Ethnobotanist, Mongabay (Oct. 31, 2006), http://news.
mongabay.com/2006/1031-interview_plotkin.html.
135. The practical value of Traditional Knowledge has featured in a variety of international agreements and 
declarations, including the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Rio Declaration, as well as 
studies undertaken by institutions including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Health Organization, the 
International Labor Organization, U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, U.N. 
Development Programme, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and many other international organizations. For example, the preamble of the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes that “respect for indigenous knowledge, 
cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper 
management of the environment.” See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, 
pmbl.; see also Secretariat of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The 
Sustainable Use of Biological Resources: Systems and National Experiences for the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge, Innovations and Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.1/38 (Jan. 12, 2001) (“[I]t has been 
recognized that [Traditional Knowledge] plays a key role in the preservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity.”). See generally U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Protecting and Promoting Traditional 
Knowledge: Systems, National Experiences and International Dimensions (Sophia Twarog 
& Promilia Kapoor eds., 2004), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcted10_en.pdf; World 
Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common Future, ch. 3, para. 74 (1987), available at http://www.
un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf (“[Indigenous] communities are the repositories of vast 
accumulations of traditional knowledge and experience that links humanity with its ancient origins. 
Their disappearance [would be] a loss for the larger society, which could learn a great deal from their 
traditional skills in sustainably managing very complex ecological systems.”).
136. For example, Article 45 of the Charter of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests states 
that “Since we highly value our technologies and believe that our biotechnologies can make important 
contributions to humanity, including ‘developed’ countries, we demand guaranteed rights to our collective 
intellectual property in both national and international law, and control over the development and 
manipulation of this knowledge.” Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests Charter art. 45, 
Feb. 15, 1992, available at www.international-alliance.org/documents/charter_eng.doc.
137. Bill of Fundamental Rights (2002) (Shuar Fed’n, Ecuador).
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marginalization, exploitation, and political oppression.138 In the context of protecting 
their biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge, the interests of most any individual 
Shuar do not differ from those of any other responsible individual: power, wealth, 
enlightenment, respect, well-being, skill, rectitude, and affection.139 The Shuar 
Directive has indicated its profound desire to not only safeguard Shuar land and 
culture, but to also protect their loved ones.140 They have also indicated a willingness to 
leverage Shuar Traditional Knowledge and cultural practices to help others in certain 
circumstances.141 This Shuar goal might be understood as a wish to promote the basic 
values of well-being and enlightenment by, for instance, combating the accelerating 
obsolescence of pharmaceutical drugs, particularly those constructed around inorganic 
chemical compounds, by tapping into the Shuar’s Traditional Knowledge, which could 
give better clues to the potential of certain forms of genetic material in a responsible, 
respectful, and sustainable way. According to members of the Shuar Directive, this 
could include the eventual development of provisions for benefit sharing142 arising out 
of the collaborative collection or use of certain approved materials collected from Shuar 
land, perhaps including financial or in-kind compensation.143 This could enable 
collaboration between Shuar representatives and contracted researchers, developers, 
and advocates of any resultant resources or products.
138. Id.
139. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of 
Public Order, 53 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (1953), reprinted in International Rules: Approaches from 
International Law and International Relations 113, 126–36 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996); 
see also Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality 96 (2001) (stating that there 
are ten basic human goods: “life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, excellence in play and work, 
excellence in agency, inner peace, friendship and community, religion, and happiness,” each of which “is 
a fundamental reason for action, and together they exhaust all of the fundamental reasons for action”). 
See generally Harold D. Lasswell & Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (1950). In the context 
of indigenous peoples, Plotkin sums it up nicely:
People like to talk about how different indigenous peoples are than us as westerners but 
people are often really much the same at the end of the day. What do they want? They 
want a good life. They want a decent life for their kids. They want clean air and water. 
And if you tell them, okay you can have more money in your pocket but all this other 
stuff is going to disappear—potable water, your medicine, your food, your sacred 
sites—it becomes a pretty obvious choice . . . . The loss of indigenous knowledge and 
culture is of a form of impoverishment . . . .
 See Butler, supra note 134.
140. See Practical Developments, supra note 117, at 127–28.
141. See id.
142. Articles 1 and 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity encourage the practice of sharing of benefits, 
including profits realized from the use of Traditional Knowledge and of the use of genetic materials 
derived therefrom, as well as technological advancements, or products that were developed using the 
Traditional Knowledge or the resources. See Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 1, 8(j), opened for 
signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter CBD].
143. Article 15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity requires parties to arrive at fair and mutually 
agreed upon terms before access is provided to indigenous genetic resources or technology is transferred. 
See id. art. 15.
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 B. Bioprospecting: The Shuar and the “Green Rush”
 Bioprospectors’ attention has been fixed on the biodiversity of the Amazon Basin 
for decades. Richard Schultes, a mid-twentieth-century ethnobotanist and something 
of a patron saint for bioprospectors, spent years among indigenous communities 
throughout the South American rainforest and collected more than 24,000 plant 
specimens.144 Two points are clear: bioprospectors’ interest in rainforest specimens 
will last as long as there is a steady demand, and scientific research on rainforest 
biodiversity is intensifying.145 In what is sarcastically referred to as the “green rush,”146 
bioprospectors are converging on the Amazon Basin in particular because of the 
many millions of plant and animal species with potential pharmaceutical value that 
await appropriation and examination.147 The term “bioprospector” applies to freelance 
consultants, government agencies, development organizations, and multinational 
corporations equally. Bioprospectors are routinely referred to as “biopirates,” 
“bioimperialists,” and “biocolonialists,” not necessarily without good reason.148 This 
is particularly problematic because the lure of the Amazon for today’s bioprospectors 
may be stronger than ever. According to science and technology policy professor 
Charles Weiss and chemical ecology professor Thomas Eisner,
144. See Richard Evans Schultes, supra note 123.
145. See K.N. Ninan, The Economics of Biodiversity Conservation: Valuation in Tropical Forest 
Ecosystems 2 (2006).
146. See, e.g., Gavin Stenton, Biopiracy Within the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Stark Illustration of Just How Abusive, 
Manipulative and Perverse the Patenting Process Can Be Towards Countries of the South, (1)2 Hertfordshire 
L.J. 30, 32–35 (2003) (setting out four well-known examples of the “green rush” across four continents).
147. See Edward O. Wilson, The Diversity of Life 132–33 (1992) (explaining that the precise number of 
plant and animal species is unknown and may be as high as 100 million, although a more realistic 
estimate is around 12 million); Robert Mendelsohn & Michael J. Balick, The Value of Undiscovered 
Pharmaceuticals in Tropical Forests, 49 Econ. Botany 223, 224–25 (1995) (identifying forty-seven 
chemical derivatives from tropical f lowering plants with significant pharmaceutical potential, and 
further surmising that at least three hundred more pharmaceutically relevant derivatives, worth an 
estimated $147 billion, remain to be discovered in tropical regions of the world).
148. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “bioprospecting” to mean “[t]he action or process of searching for 
living organisms, (now) spec. [sic] for plant or animal species from which commercially valuable genetic 
material, biochemical, medicinal drugs, etc., can be obtained. Cf. Biopiracy.” Bioprospecting Definition, 
Oxford Eng. Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/251068?redirectedFrom=Bioprospecting#
eid (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); see also Laurie Anne Whitt, Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property and the 
New Imperial Science, 23 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 211 (1998) (referring to bioprospectors’ techniques as 
“biocolonialism”); Christopher J. Hunter, Comment, Sustainable Bioprospecting: Using Private Contracts and 
International Legal Principles and Policies to Conserve Raw Medicinal Materials, 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
129, 139 (1997); Michael I. Jeffrey, Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing Under the 
Convention on Biodiversity and the Bonn Guidelines, 6 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 747, 755 (2002) (referring to 
bioprospecting as “the search of biodiversity for valuable genetic and biochemical information”); Erik B. 
Bluemel, Separating Instrumental From Intrinsic Rights: Toward an Understanding of Indigenous Participation 
in International Rule-Making, 30 Am. Indian L. Rev. 55, 119 (2005) (referring to bioprospecting as “the 
search for biodiverse genetic or biochemical information in the wild for the purpose of commercial 
exploitation”); John R. Adair, Comment, The Bioprospecting Question: Should the United States Charge 
Biotechnology Companies for the Commercial Use of Public Wild Genetic Resources, 24 Ecology L.Q. 131 (1997) 
(referring to bioprospecting as “the search for wild diversity for valuable genetic information”).
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Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly, and researchers are producing so many 
new ideas for possible new products, that there is no effective limit on the number 
of bioprospecting targets. The market for new products is expanding much faster 
than the rate at which developing countries are likely to be entering the market.149
Bioprospectors are generally aware that the majority of the world’s biodiversity is 
concentrated in developing countries.150 The worldwide loss of biodiversity is indeed 
accelerating as a result.151 Notably, Conservation International has designated all of 
the Shuar’s land a “biodiversity hotspot.”152 In other words, the Tropical Andes, of 
which Shuar land is a part, and which collectively comprises less than 1% of Earth’s 
land surface area, is home to one-tenth of all plant life.153 In addition, the National 
Cancer Institute (NCI) and other medical research organizations have discovered 
promising rainforest plant compounds with anticancer and anti-HIV/AIDS 
properties, among various other specimens with the potential to fight or cure other 
devastating human ailments.154 Less than 1% of rainforest plant species have been 
examined for their medicinal value.155
 Throughout the last several decades, exploitative techniques have been increasingly 
levied against indigenous societies in the Amazon Basin to access this Traditional 
Knowledge. This may not be surprising in light of the breadth of rainforest biota, a 
significant percentage of which could yield valuable extracts with pharmaceutical 
potential. Toward the end of the twentieth century, exclusive scientific reliance on the 
synthesis of new chemicals—not from nature—for pharmaceutical drugs was starting 
to wane, particularly after potent anticancer agents in plants, such as taxol and 
turmeric, were discovered. More medical research organizations and government 
institutions have turned to the Amazon Basin with conspicuous interest.156 This 
explains the increasing interest among bioprospectors in the plant germplasm within 
149. See Charles Weiss & Thomas Eisner, Economics of Biodiversity, Issues in Sci. & Tech. Online, http://
www.issues.org/15.4/forum.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
150. See Ninan, supra note 145, at 2.
151. See Thomas Lovejoy, Biodiversity: Dismissing Scientific Process, Sci. Am., Jan. 2002, at 70.
152. See Tropical Andes—Overview, Conservation Int’l, http://www.conservation.org/where/priority_
areas/hotspots/south_america/Tropical-Andes/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
153. See Tropical Andes—Species, Conservation Int’l, http://www.conservation.org/where/priority_areas/
hotspots/south_america/Tropical-Andes/Pages/biodiversity.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
154. See, e.g., Michael J. Balick & Paul Alan Cox, Plants, People, and Culture: The Science of 
Ethnobotany (1996); James A. Duke & Rodolfo Vasquez, Amazonian Ethnobotanical 
Dictionary (1994); Richard Evans Schultes & Robert F. Raffauf, The Healing Forest: 
Medicinal and Toxic Plants of the Northwest Amazonia (1990); James L. Castner et al., 
Field Guide to Medicinal and Useful Plants of the Upper Amazon (1988).
155. Facts About Rainforests, Nature Conservancy, http://www.nature.org/rainforests/explore/facts.html 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2014); see also Donald D. Jackson, Searching for Medicinal Wealth in Amazonia, 
Smithsonian Mag., Feb. 1989, at 95–103.
156. See Abena Dove Osseo-Asare, Bitter Roots: The Search for Healing Plants in Africa 32 (2014) 
(“By the late 1980’s, the world was witnessing a massive ‘green rush’ as new laboratory techniques allowed for 
more rapid screening of plants to discover improved medicines, crops, and industrial chemicals.”).
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the Shuar territory, particularly since early efforts at locating useful plants and animals 
without reference to Traditional Knowledge were notoriously unsuccessful. For 
example, between 1956 and 1981, the NCI regularly searched for new compounds in 
rainforest plant and animal life, including in Ecuador. During that time, its “plant 
discovery” program randomly collected and tested more than 35,000 species of plants 
for antitumor activity.157 Funding for this program dried up in late 1981.158
 Norman Farnsworth, a fairly prolific (and colorful) professor of pharmacognosy 
who advocates the use of Traditional Knowledge to identify plants containing potential 
pharmaceutical agents, offers an explanation as to why the NCI program failed:
One could argue that this approach of “blind” screening any and all plants 
available in sufficient quantity for testing is entirely unscientific and too costly 
to be continued. Perhaps these are reasons for the NCI’s canceling its program 
on anti-tumor plants. Surely a program that fails to produce a useful drug after 
25 years of testing more than 35,000 species of plants must be examined to 
determine what went wrong!159
This extended lack of success also spawned a further short-lived trend: for a brief 
period, the NCI’s researchers focused exclusively on synthetic chemicals. However, 
by 1986 its plant discovery program was back in business, with a new arsenal of 
strategies—including use of Traditional Knowledge—to “discover” usable agents. 
The NCI has since identified approximately two thousand plant species endemic to 
the rainforest that have potential anticancer properties.160
 The recognition that the Traditional Knowledge of indigenous societies could be a 
direct route to useful plant and animal extracts with valuable pharmaceutical potential 
hit bioprospectors the world over like a ton of bricks. This was a monumental trend to 
face; bioprospectors could actually mitigate the risk of turning over tens of thousands 
of plant specimens to pharmaceutical researchers from which no valuable agents might 
be discovered. The medical and academic communities started to advocate for the use 
of Traditional Knowledge to locate and collect samples of biodiversity that might yield 
valuable extracts from which new drugs might be developed. Interesting corroborative 
statistics came to light: it was estimated that 80% of developing countries rely on 
traditional medicine derived from Traditional Knowledge for the primary health care 
needs of as many as four billion people, and 85% of this traditional medicine makes use 
157. Norman R. Farnsworth & William D. Loub, Information Gathering and Databases That Are Pertinent to 
the Development of Plant-Derived Drugs, in Plants: The Potentials for Extracting Protein, 
Medicines, and Other Useful Chemicals 181 (Office of Tech. Assessment 1983).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Facts About Rainforests, supra note 155. The National Cancer Institute (NCI) is currently testing upward 
of 80,000 plant and animal extracts for cancer fighting agents. See Drug Discovery at the National Cancer 
Institute, Nat’l Cancer Inst., http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/NCIdrugdiscovery (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2014). The NCI’s use of plant compounds in its drug research is only one example of 
many. Merck, for example, has also long had a natural products division, which has isolated various 
agents for its pharmaceutical drug development, such as its cholesterol-lowering drug Mevacor, which is 
derived from a species of fungus.
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of plant-extracted compounds.161 It was also estimated that random, or “blind,” 
screening has a success rate of about 1 in 10,000 specimens.162 However, when testing 
is combined with the Traditional Knowledge of an indigenous group, the success rate 
can be as high as 1 in 2 specimens.163 Farnsworth further explains the challenge:
[I]n my opinion, future programs of drug development from higher plants should 
include a careful evaluation of historical as well as current claims of the effectiveness 
of plants as drugs from alien cultures. Such information is rapidly disappearing as 
our own culture and ideas permeate the less developed countries of the world 
where there remains a heavy dependence on plants as sources of drugs.164
It followed that the idea caught on that the Traditional Knowledge of indigenous 
societies could represent beliefs and practices that make use of particular plants, and 
that where this knowledge is unique to a particular cultural group, it may have been 
refined over vast expanses of time, such as centuries or even millennia. Bioprospectors 
have apparently seized on this approach to search for new and better ways to find usable 
biological specimens. In short, the results were much improved from “blind” screening.
 The first task of the bioprospector is thus to target the richest possible geographical 
overlap of Traditional Knowledge and biodiversity, which maximizes the chance of 
collecting valuable specimens of biodiversity. The geographical targets are typically 
areas with robust biodiversity, inhabited by indigenous societies with well-preserved 
cultural practices, which have not been substantially altered by the effects of globalization 
or otherwise diluted by a dominant culture.165 In other words, bioprospectors generally 
seek cultures that possess credible Traditional Knowledge that is intimately tied to the 
biodiverse ecosystem in which they live or to which they are proximate.
 In terms of bioprospectors’ identifications and expectations, the process of 
bioprospecting seems to be informed by an “us versus them” mentality, either 
implicitly or explicitly.166 Farnsworth sums up the process in a less-than-artful way:
161. See Norman R. Farnsworth & Djaja Doel Soejarto, Potential Consequences of Plant Extinction in the United 
States on the Current and Future Availability of Prescription Drugs, 39 Econ. Botany 231, 231–40 (1985).
162. See Bioprospecting/Biopiracy and Indigenous Peoples, ETC Group (Dec. 26, 1995), http://www.etcgroup.
org/content/bioprospectingbiopiracy-and-indigenous-peoples.
163. See id.; see also Visser, supra note 17, at 213 (“Many . . . instances of the appropriation and exploitation of 
traditional knowledge . . . involve the use of both genetic resources and traditional ecological knowledge 
about the properties of such resources.”).
164. See Norman R. Farnsworth, Screening Plants for New Medicines, in Biodiversity 95 (Edward O. Wilson 
ed., 1988).
165. See John Mohawk, Subsistence and Materialism, in Paradigm Wars, supra note 21, at 26–29.
166. See Carl Coon, One Planet, One People: Beyond “Us vs. Them” 30 (2004) (discussing the ethical 
implications of how a global society develops, functions, and regulates conflict, and noting that “the ‘us 
versus them’ syndrome is an essential element of [any community]”). For more on the “us versus them” 
phenomenon, including in the context of propaganda, see Harold D. Lasswell, The Function of the 
Propagandist, 38 Int’l J. Ethics 258 (1928); Harold D. Lasswell, The Theory of Political Propaganda, 21 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 627 (1927); Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, Communications Theory and World Public 
Order: The Anthropomorphic, Jurisprudential Foundations of International Human Rights, 47 Va. J. Int’l L. 725, 
750–54 (2007) (discussing the philosophical and psychological underpinnings of how certain individuals are 
included in the symbolic “we,” and how certain individuals are included in the symbolic enemy, the “other”).
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What really seems to be the problem is that most pharmaceutical firms, as well 
as decision-making offices in government agencies, lack personnel who have a 
full understanding and appreciation of the potential payoff in this area of 
research [dealing with gaining access to Traditional Knowledge to identify 
valuable specimens of biodiversity]. For example, new programs in drug 
development are usually initiated by the presentation of a proposal by a research 
staff member before a group of peers and research administrators. Following is 
one possible scenario: Dr. E.Z. Greenleaf prepares his arguments for a new drug 
development program at the ABC Pharmaceutical Corporation in which he 
proposes to study plants as a source of new drugs. His approach to the program 
is to examine written medicinal folklore to obtain information on plants allegedly 
used by primitive peoples for certain specified diseases. He might even be brave 
enough to suggest that the ABC Pharmaceutical Corporation hire one or two 
physicians to travel to Africa, Borneo, New Caledonia, or other exotic areas to 
live with the people for a year or so. During this period, Drs. U. Canduit and 
I.M. Reliant would observe the witch doctors treating patients and then would 
make their own diagnoses of each patient and conduct follow-up observations 
on outcome. When improvement is noted, they would record which plants had 
been used to treat the patients. These plants would then be collected and sent to 
the Research Laboratory of the ABC Pharmaceutical Corporation located in 
Heartbreak, Colorado, for scientific studies. Total cost of such a 5-year program 
would be less than the cost of a new jet fighter.167
 With this in mind, and from the point of view of bioprospectors, the Shuar are 
apparently superlative candidates: they are indigenous to one of the world’s richest 
biodiversity hotspots and the development of their Traditional Knowledge in relation 
to this biodiversity has been steady and generally uninterrupted for a vast expanse of 
time. For example, the Shuar use more than one hundred plant species to treat 
gastrointestinal ailments alone.
 C.  Threshold Considerations: Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, and Intellectual 
Property Protections
 A thorough review of case studies of similar appropriations indicates that 
bioprospectors typically attempt to justify168 their actions—the extraction of plant 
genetic resources without compensation or the institution of benefit-sharing regimes—
167. See Farnsworth, supra note 164, at 96; see also, Diane Jukofsky, Medicinal Plant Research Leads Scientists 
to Rain Forests, Drug Tropics, Apr. 22, 1991, at 26; Fiona Godlee, Medicinal Plants: Another Man’s 
Poison, 305 Brit. Med. J. 1583 (1992); Leslie Roberts, Chemical Prospecting: Hope for Vanishing 
Ecosystems? 256 Science 1142 (1992); Tracy Dobson, Loss of Biodiversity: An International Environmental 
Policy Perspective, 17 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 277 (1992).
168. Of course, there may be bioprospectors whose goals relate to the preservation of rainforest biota. Indeed, 
there are thousands of governmental and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to environmental, 
anthropological, ethnological, botanical, and other forms of preservation out of respect for indigenous 
societies, recognition of the intrinsic value of the natural world, or good, old-fashioned altruism. One of 
them, Mark Plotkin, reminds us that “conservation should not be about what’s in it for us. We shouldn’t 
just save the forest because it might offer the cure to AIDS, hemorrhoids, or pancreatic cancer. There 
are spiritual and ethical aspects to conservation that are often overlooked.” See Butler, supra note 134.
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by arguing that knowledge about biodiversity represents the “common heritage of the 
humankind.”169 In other words, biodiversity and knowledge about it are new forms of 
property under international law: res extra commercium (“a thing outside commerce”). 
This designation does not allow for the property or territory (res) to be appropriated by 
a state or indigenous population in a territorial sense, rather it means that all resources 
contained therein or value derived therefrom are the property of all mankind.170 This 
designation has also been ascribed to Earth’s moon and its seabed.171
 When viewed through the lens of neoclassical economics, property theory is 
decidedly utilitarian. Law professor Carol Rose has argued that the development of 
property rights is a societal outcome designed to maximize the collective welfare.172 
Property theory is thought to offer certain protections for scarce resources as well, 
such as providing the individuals and groups who own the resources with incentives 
to leverage them to benefit society; avoiding the so-called “tragedy of the commons” 
whereby resources subject to communal or “un-owned” use are exhausted because of 
the human tendency toward overuse when ownership rights are not devolved to 
individuals; reducing “rent dissipation,” which refers to the exploitation of resources 
belonging to other groups or communities; and encouraging efforts to sustain the 
resource to promote commerce.173
 Bioprospectors are thus pointing to the emergence of authority in constituting a 
new fundamental power arrangement—where authority is also understood as having a 
normative element—from which they claim to have the power to act. These important 
understandings condition the extent to which bioprospectors might lawfully access 
169. See Aldo Armando Cocca, The Principle of the ‘Common Heritage of All Mankind’ as Applied to Natural Resources 
from Outer Space and Celestial Bodies, in Proceedings of the Sixteenth Colloquium on the Law of 
Outer Space 172 (Mortimer D. Schwartz ed., 1974) (introducing the concept of res communis humanitatis, 
“the common heritage of mankind”); Paul Gepts, Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners Be 
Compensated?, 134 Plant Physiology 1295, 1295–1307 (2004); Edgar Asebey & Jill Kempenaar, 
Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 703, 
707–08 (1995) (discussing the “common heritage” concept as it relates to plant biodiversity); Rebecca 
Margulies, Protecting Biodiversity: Recognizing International Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic 
Resources, 14 Mich. J. Int’l L. 322, 330 (1993) (generally discussing the “common heritage” concept); Nico 
Schrijver, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources Versus the Common Heritage of Mankind: 
Complementary or Contradictory Principles of International Economic Law, in International Law and 
Development 87, 95–101 (1998) (discussing the “common heritage” concept). But see Kemal Baslar, The 
Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law 307 (1998) (excerpting a 
quote from Diana Ponce Nava at the proceedings of an American Society of International Law conference on 
international land use law in 1993, rejecting the notion that Mexico’s tropical biodiversity is the common 
heritage of mankind: “This [biodiversity] is not a common heritage of mankind; it is a heritage of Mexicans—
Mexican generations, present and future. We are not ready to give away these resources, which, according to 
the principle of sovereignty over natural resources, belong to the Mexican nation”).
170. See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds & Robert P. Merges, Outer Space Problems of Law and Policy 
94 (1997).
171. See id.
172. See generally Carol M. Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and 
Rhetoric of Ownership (1994).
173. See id. at 164.
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plant biota on the sacred land of the Shuar, and perhaps even the Traditional 
Knowledge necessary to identify active, valuable compounds in these plants.
 There are multiple sources of law174 that either bioprospectors or indigenous 
communities might cite to provide authoritative support, but which should control? Of 
key consideration are the rights addressed in sources of conventional international 
law,175 customary international law, certain persuasive judicial decisions,176 and the 
174. In the instant circumstances, the appropriation represents a one-way f low of biodiversity from the 
biologically diverse “South” to the technologically advanced “North.” The “North” is replete with 
advanced research facilities and long-established mechanisms of patent protection, which protect any 
research and discoveries derived from the ethnobotanicals in question. The “North” can thus encroach 
onto the historical, culturally traditional, and venerable relationship between the ethnobotanicals in 
question and indigenous groups such as the Shuar. This encroachment violates the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), which supports the “South’s” sovereignty over its ethnobotanical and 
genetic resources and seeks to prevent their exploitation by “Northern” corporations and organizations, 
such as the bioprospectors at issue. See discussion infra notes 180–82. The United States—the source of 
the bioprospectors at issue—has signed but not ratified the CBD, which means that it is a persuasive, 
but not controlling, source of law. Ecuador has signed and ratified it. The argument would thus follow 
that the bioprospectors’ actions contravened Article 2 of the CBD, which stipulates that the “[c]ountry 
of origin of genetic resources” (i.e., “the country which possesses those genetic resources in in-situ 
conditions”) has sovereign ownership of any “Genetic resources” (i.e., “genetic material of actual or 
potential value”), “Biological resources” (which “includes genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, 
populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for 
humanity”), or any other “Domesticated or cultivated species” (i.e., “species in which the evolutionary 
process has been inf luenced by humans to meet their needs”). See CBD, supra note 142, art. 2. If the 
government of Ecuador recognizes the Shuar’s sovereignty over the territory from which the 
ethnobotanical resources were removed, and if the Shuar Federation’s Charter speaks to the Shuar’s 
ownership of the resources in Shuar-owned territory (or if the Bill of Fundamental Rights addresses 
bioprospecting), the CBD would be relevant.
175. There are various sources of conventional international law which concern the protection of intellectual 
property, including the CBD and the World Trade Organization Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights Agreement (the “TRIPS Agreement”), among other sources. CBD, supra note 142; Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.LM. 
1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Article 3 of the CBD sets out that states have sovereign rights 
over their natural resources. CBD, supra note 142, art. 3. Article 8(j) of the CBD recognizes the rights 
of indigenous communities, such as the Shuar, and their Traditional Knowledge and practices. Id. art. 
8(j). Specifically, it states:
Subject to its national legislation, [contracting parties shall] respect, preserve and maintain 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of 
such knowledge, innovations and practices, and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices . . . .
 Id. In short, it can be argued that Article 8(j) vests the Shuar with three rights. First, the CBD 
acknowledges the Shuar cultivators’ and farmers’ traditional rights over their biological resources. 
Second, it requires that any outside use or application of the Shuar cultivators’ and farmers’ Traditional 
Knowledge, innovations, and practices always be subject to the Shuar’s approval and involvement. 
Third, it requires that any ensuing benefit (derived from the appropriated resource) be shared with the 
Shuar. The Bonn Guidelines further establish a link between specimens of biodiversity and Traditional 
Knowledge in the obligation it places on seekers of indigenous traditional knowledge and related 
specimens of biodiversity to acquire explicit informed consent from the indigenous society. Under the 
Bonn Guidelines, the indigenous community should have the right to deny outside access to both the 
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domestic law of Ecuador177 and the United States.178 Moreover, well over fifty countries 
have developed, or are in the process of promulgating, legal and regulatory regimes 
that govern access to Traditional Knowledge and benefit sharing with indigenous 
biodiversity and the traditional knowledge. See generally Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization (2002) [hereinafter Bonn 
Guidelines], available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf. TRIPS can be 
construed to provide certain measures of protection against the commercial exploitation of indigenous 
knowledge. For example, Article 27(2) sets out that signatory states are permitted to exclude an 
invention from patent protection in order to prevent “commercial exploitation” of the invention, so long 
as it is necessary to protect “public order or morality.” See TRIPS Agreement, supra, art. 27(2).
176. Salient and interesting case law has come out of the United States and Australia in particular. See, e.g., 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) 
(determining that Native American tribes were sovereign nations at the time of first contact, which 
means they retain their sovereign rights in any circumstance where these rights were not explicitly ceded 
by a treaty or otherwise abrogated by an act of Congress; the arguments in these cases have been used by 
some indigenous communities in the United States to argue that federal intellectual property regimes 
hold no sway over indigenous practices and Traditional Knowledge); Foster v. Mountford (1976) 29 FLR 
233 (Austl.) (prohibiting the publication of a book detailing an aboriginal community’s Traditional 
Knowledge on the basis that it disclosed culturally and spiritually significant information that had been 
supplied to the author—an anthropologist—in confidence, and to disseminate this information in any 
way constituted a breach of this confidentiality); Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 IPR 
481 (Austl.) (discussing an indigenous community’s collective rights over certain culturally significant 
artistic designs); Neowarra v. Western Australia (2004) FCA 1092 (Austl.) (examining whether 
Traditional Knowledge of biodiversity can be subject to protection under intellectual property law); 
Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 FCR 240 (Austl.) (considering the issue of traditional 
indigenous culturally significant artistic designs as intellectual property).
177. Ecuador promulgated a new constitution in 1998, which abrogated the 1830 Constitution. See 1998 
Constitution, supra note 44. The 1998 Constitution additionally obliges the state to safeguard these 
rights, and allows for no restriction on their exercise, subject to other provisions on, for example, 
eminent domain. See id. arts. 16, 18, 23, 33. This constitution also addresses collective ownership, such 
as by an indigenous community, and can only be adversely possessed by the state in the case of public 
utility. See id. art. 84 (2)–(3). Collectively owned lands are exempt from predial taxation and can be 
transferred free of charge, though ownership is inalienable, unencumbered, and indivisible. Id. Under 
these provisions on collective ownership, the constitution empowers the state to institute regimes that 
substantiate the rights and prohibitions set out by the constitution itself. Id.
178. Through the prism of U.S. law, assuming an appropriate venue could be ascertained, there might be a 
persuasive exception to the general statute of limitations rule to allow plaintiffs to “reach back” and win 
damages for the entire duration of an alleged violation, even where some infringements occurred outside 
of the three-year statute of limitations period. See Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983). 
Judge Posner’s opinion in Taylor outlines the “fraudulent concealment” test, which has two prongs: 1) 
successful concealment of the infringement, and 2) intent to conceal the infringement. See id. at 1118 
(citing Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 1971)). The Taylor court applied 
this rule and found that the defendant fraudulently concealed the infringement. See id. at 1119. The 
court thus held that the plaintiff ’s recovery for defendant’s infringements should be allowed for all acts, 
including those infringements that occurred outside of the three-year statutory limitations period, so 
long as at least one act of infringement occurred within the three-year statutory period. See id. at 1112, 
1119. The court additionally held that allowing recovery for all infringing acts (within and outside the 
three-year statutory limitations period) was consistent with the goals of the statute of limitations. To 
further justify this conclusion, the court pointed to the occurrence of the defendant’s fraudulent 
concealment of his infringement, which would have “tolled” the running of the statutory limitations 
period (i.e., prevented the time for filing suit from running). See id. at 1119.
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societies, including sui generis protections.179 These various sources of law provide 
persuasive guidance on issues including prior informed consent180 and benefit sharing181 
arising out of the collection and use of material from Shuar land, including financial or 
in-kind compensation.182 They also provide guidance on collaboration between Shuar 
representatives and contracted researchers, developers, and advocates of any resulting 
resources or products, including the development licensing processes and agreements 
governing disclosures. Of course, analysis of how the law of copyright, patents, trade 
secrets, and intellectual property more generally might be construed to apply to 
indigenous peoples’ circumstances and Traditional Knowledge is hardly a novel 
179. See Andean Community of Nations, Decision No. 391—Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources 
(July 2, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=9446; see also Kerry ten Kate 
& Sarah A. Laird, Bioprospecting Agreements and Benefit Sharing with Local Communities, in Poor 
People’s Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing Countries, supra note 
17, at 138, 156 (setting out a partial list of countries which have developed or are developing policies 
related to access to Traditional Knowledge and benefit sharing).
180. Article 15(4) of the Convention on Biological Diversity governs instances where an outside party has 
access to the indigenous party’s resources. See CBD, supra note 142, art. 15(4). It requires that any 
outside access be governed by “mutually agreed terms.” Id. This means that informed negotiations must 
occur between the indigenous party (the Shuar) and any potential user before resources are appropriated. 
It is important to note that this must be sufficiently addressed by national legislation. Arguably, access-
to-resource agreements executed by the parties can only be valid if they are implemented through the 
sovereign party’s official channel, which ensures that community interests are not jeopardized. See id.
181. Articles 1 and 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity encourage the practice of sharing benefits, 
including profits realized from the use of Traditional Knowledge and of the use of genetic materials 
derived therefrom, as well as technological advancements, or products that were developed using the 
Traditional Knowledge or the resources. See id. arts. 1, 8(j). Article 15(7) details how any benefits which 
arise from research, development, or commercial utilization of the indigenous party’s genetic resources 
must be shared. See id. art. 15(7). Specifically, Article 15(7) states that:
Each contracting party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures . . . with 
the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way [and on “mutually agreed terms”] the results 
of research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other 
utilization of genetic resources, with the Contracting Party providing such resources.
 Id. This provision might lend persuasiveness to arguments for an exception to the typical treatment of the 
statutory period under the federal Copyright Act. It is extremely difficult for indigenous communities in 
the “South” to become aware of and monitor activities of corporations and organizations in the “North,” to 
say nothing of an indigenous community’s ability to precisely predict the extent of future benefits which 
might be derived from the “North’s” use of resources appropriated from the “South.” See id. arts. 1, 8(j).
182. Article 15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity requires parties to arrive at fair and mutually 
agreed upon terms before access is provided to indigenous genetic resources or technology is transferred. 
See id. art. 15.
183. See, e.g., World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, at 3, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/26/6 (Aug. 25, 2000); WIPO, 
Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders (2001); 
WIPO Roundtable on Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge, Geneva, Switz., Nov. 1–2, 1999, 
Report, WIPO Doc. WIPO/IPTK/RT/99/7 (May 4, 2000); WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, The Protection of 
Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore: Overview of Policy Objectives and Core Principles, WIPO Doc. 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/13 (Aug. 20, 2004); WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Geneva, Switz., June 13–21, 2002, 
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undertaking; there has been a great deal of authoritative reporting183 and scholarship184 
by an array of experts and practitioners.
Third Session Report, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/17 (June 21, 2002); WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 
Geneva, Switz., July 7–15, 2003, Fifth Session Report, WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/15 (Aug. 4, 
2003); WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore, Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore, Legal and Policy Options, 
WIPO Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/3 (Dec. 1, 2003); Special Rapporteur on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous 
Peoples, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (July 28, 1993) (by Erica-Irene A.
Daes); Special Rapporteur on the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, Final Report on the 
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 
(June 21, 1995) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes).
184. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World 
Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 11 (1998); Christophe 
Antons, Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Intellectual 
Property Law in the Asia-Pacific Region (2009); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional 
Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 Marq. 
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 155 (2006); Graeme W. Austin, Re-Treating Intellectual Property? The WAI 262 
Proceeding and the Heuristics of Intellectual Property Law, 11 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 333 (2003); 
Josephine Axt et al., Biotechnology, Indigenous Peoples, and Intellectual Property Rights 
(1993); Bryan Bachner, Intellectual Property Rights and China: The Modernization of 
Traditional Knowledge (2008); S. Biber-Klemm & T. Cottier, Rights to Plant Genetic 
Resources and Traditional Knowledge: Basic Issues and Perspectives (2006); Michael F. 
Brown, Who Owns Native Culture? 45 (2003); Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky, Valuing 
Local Knowledge: Indigenous People and Intellectual Property Rights (1996); F. Burhenne-
Guilmin & S. Casey-Lefkowitz, The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Hard Won Global Achievement, 3 
Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 43, 51 (1992); David A. Cleveland & Stephen C. Murray, The World’s Crop Genetic 
Resources and the Rights of Indigenous Farmers, 38 Current Anthropology 477 (1997); Rosemary J. 
Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation and the 
Law (1998); Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional Knowledge: The Case for 
Intellectual Property Protection, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 371 (2004); Shelton H. David et al., Traditional 
Knowledge and Sustainable Development: Proceedings of the 1993 United Nations 
International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (1995); David R. Downes, Comments on 
Rights of Indigenous Farmers in Crop Genetic Resources, 38 Current Anthropology 498 (1997); David R. 
Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 
253 (2000); Graham Dutfield & Darrell Addison Posey, Beyond Intellectual Property: 
Toward Traditional Resource Rights for Indigenous Peoples (1996); Graham Dutfield, 
Intellectual Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (2004); Graham 
Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 233 (2001); Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development, 257 Science 903 (1992); Leanne M. Fecteau, The 
Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions About Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. Third World L.J. 
69 (2001); Poor People’s Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing 
Countries (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004); Johanna Gibson, Community Resources: 
Intellectual Property, International Trade and Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
(2005); Johanna Gibson, Intellectual Property Systems, Traditional Knowledge, and the Legal Authority of 
Community, 26 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 280 (2004); M.A. Gollin, An Intellectual Property Rights 
Framework for Biodiversity Prospecting, in Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic Resources for 
Sustainable Development 159 (Walter V. Reid et al. eds., 1993); Stephen A. Hansen & Justin W. 
VanFleet, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property (2003); Frederick Hendrickx et al., 
Access to Genetic Resources: A Legal Analysis, in Biodiplomacy: Genetic Resources and International 
Relations 139 (Vicente Sanchez & Calestous Juma eds., 1994); Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual 
Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic Development of Least Developed Countries, 27 Colum. J.L. &
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 Many point to the reality that the international community has only recently 
started to develop protections for Traditional Knowledge. In 1981, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the U.N. Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) set out a model law that afforded some 
protection for indigenous folklore. In 1989, following a years-long disagreement 
concerning the accessibility of plant genetic resources by all mankind, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations resolved that national sovereignty 
was a deciding factor as it pertained to farmers’ rights to ownership of plant genetic 
resources, which provided a measure of support for indigenous people to manage 
resources on their land.185 In 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
laid foundational protections for Traditional Knowledge, and two years later, in 
1994, the World Trade Organization Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (the “TRIPS Agreement”) was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which set a new global 
standard for intellectual property protections.186
 The CBD vests developing countries with great opportunities to conserve their 
biological diversity. Typically, outcomes are a function of interpreting national 
legislation and CBD provisions and mechanisms to implement and enforce the treaty. 
While the CBD provides that states have sovereign rights over their natural resources, 
 Arts 277 (2004); Michael J. Huft, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Question of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1678 (1995); Feifei Jiang, The Problem with Patents: Traditional Knowledge 
and International IP Law, Harv. Int’l Rev. (Dec. 19, 2008, 9:01 PM), http://hir.harvard.edu/global-
education/the-problem-with-patents; Evanson C. Kamau & Gerd Winter, Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and the Law: Solutions for Access and Benefit Sharing (2009); Paul 
Kuruk, Legal Protection for Heritage Rights: Traditional Knowledge, Folklore and 
Genetic Resources (2002); Laird, supra note 19; Charles McManis, Biodiversity and the Law: 
Intellectual Property, Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge (2007); John Mugabe, 
Intellectual Property Protection and Traditional Knowledge (1999); Accessing and Sharing 
the Benefits of the Genomics Revolution (Peter W.B. Phillips & Chika B. Onwuekwe eds., 2007); 
Sandra L. Pinel & Michael J. Evans, Tribal Sovereignty and the Control of Knowledge, in Intellectual 
Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples: A Source Book (1994); Ronald Sackville, Traditional 
Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture, Legal Protection of Indigenous Culture in Australia, 11 
Cardozo J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 711 (2003); Lakshmi Sarma, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the 
Form of International Agreements, 13 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 107 (1999); Vandana Shiva, The Plunder 
of Nature and Knowledge (1997); Sivashree Sundaram, Battling Bills, Beans and Biopiracy, 15 Alb. L.J. 
Sci. & Tech. 545 (2005); Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property: Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2003); Silke von Lewinski, Traditional 
Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture: The Protection of Folklore, 11 Cardozo J. Int’l. & 
Comp. L. 747 (2003); Indigenous Heritage and Intellectual Property: Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (Silke von Lewinski ed., 2d ed. 2008); Michael Woods, Food 
for Thought: The Biopiracy of Jasmine and Basmati Rice, 13 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 123 (2002); Farhana 
Yamin, The Biodiversity Convention and Intellectual Property Rights (1995).
185. See U.N. Food & Agric. Org., Tenure of Indigenous Peoples Territories and REDD+ as a 
Forestry Management Incentive: The Case of Mesoamerican Countries 7–35 (2012), available 
at http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i2875e/i2875e.pdf.
186. See generally CBD, supra note 142; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 175; see also Overview: The TRIPS 
Agreement, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2014).
912
IndIgenous Real & Intellectual PRoPeRty RIghts: the case of the shuaR NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
it also recognizes the rights of indigenous communities, such as the Shuar, and their 
Traditional Knowledge and practices.187 Specifically, it states:
Subject to its national legislation, [contracting parties shall] respect, preserve 
and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, and promote their wider application 
with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices, and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices[.]188
In short, it can be argued that the CBD vests the Shuar with three rights. First, the 
CBD acknowledges the Shuar cultivators’ and farmers’ traditional rights over their 
biological resources.189 Second, it requires that any outside use or application of the 
Shuar cultivators’ and farmers’ Traditional Knowledge, innovations, and practices 
always be subject to the Shuar’s approval and involvement.190 Third, it requires that 
any ensuing benefit (derived from the appropriated resource) be shared with the 
Shuar.191 The (voluntary) Bonn Guidelines further establish a link between specimens 
of biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge by obligating seekers of Traditional 
Knowledge and related specimens of biodiversity to acquire explicit informed consent 
from the indigenous society.192 Under the Bonn Guidelines, the indigenous 
community should have the right to deny outside access to both their land’s 
biodiversity and their Traditional Knowledge.
 The TRIPS Agreement is the most comprehensive source of conventional law on 
intellectual property;193 it sets minimum standards for intellectual property protections 
for nationals of all World Trade Organization (WTO) members (which include 
Ecuador and the United States), so that the intellectual property laws of WTO member 
countries must rise to meet these standards in the name of spreading harmonized 
protections for goods and services around the globe.194 As a result, approximately one 
hundred countries (of the WTO’s current membership of 159 countries) have now 
developed, or are in the process of promulgating, domestic legal and regulatory regimes 
that specify types of intellectual property protections.195 There is a substantial body of 
187. Compare CBD, supra note 142, art. 3, with id. art. 8(j).




192. See Bonn Guidelines, supra note 175.
193. See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 186.
194. See id.
195. See Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#Transition (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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research on the extent to which these formal intellectual property protections might 
apply to Traditional Knowledge.196
 Such sui generis protection regimes could govern access to the Shuar’s Traditional 
Knowledge and guide prior informed consent and benefit sharing requirements, 
possibly including financial or in-kind compensation. They could also provide guidance 
on the development of licensing processes and agreements governing disclosures.
 D.  Workable Strategies for the Shuar to Benefit from Products Developed Using Their 
Traditional Knowledge
 The increasing proliferation of multinational corporate operations in the Amazon 
Basin has put several indigenous societies, including the Shuar, in the precarious 
position of seeking to simultaneously protect their land, resources, and Traditional 
Knowledge from the influence of or theft by external actors as quickly as possible, 
particularly since most authoritative sources of international law afford them little or 
no explicit protection. However, as mentioned above, there has been an increasingly 
widespread conceptual acknowledgement of the importance of benefit sharing with 
indigenous groups, at least among certain nonpharmaceutical commentators, when 
products are developed using Traditional Knowledge.197 Accordingly, a potentially 
workable alternative is the eventual mainstreaming of certain forms of reciprocity—
immediate-term, medium-term, and long-term—into legally binding convenios, 
which set out research, development, pharmaceutical, and other agreements between 
outside actors and indigenous peoples, including the Shuar.198
 An immediate-term legal agreement would reflect the continuing needs of many 
indigenous communities, including the Shuar. It could take the form of a participatory 
process between the outside organization and community leadership, as well as 
community members, which would isolate critical needs that could be satisfied by the 
outside organization as an initial form of compensation for the benefits derived from its 
partnership with the indigenous community.199
196. See sources cited supra notes 183–84.
197. Policy positions to this effect have been set out by the American Anthropological Association, the 
International Society of Ethnobiology, and the Society of Economic Botany, among others. See Stephen 
B. Brush, Indigenous Knowledge of Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights: The Role of 
Anthropology, 96 Am. Anthropologist 653, 653 (1993); About the Society for Economic Botany, Soc’y 
for Econ. Botany, http://www.econbot.org/index.php?module=content&type=user&func=view&
pid=2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); Who We Are, Int’l Soc’y of Ethnobiology, http://ethnobiology.net/
about/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
198. This projection mirrors an approach taken by a pharmaceutical organization called Shaman 
Pharmaceuticals. See Donald E. Bierer et al., Shaman Pharmaceuticals: Integrating Indigenous Knowledge, 
Tropical Medicinal Plants, Medicine, Modern Science and Reciprocity into a Novel Drug Discovery Approach, 
Network Sci., http://www.netsci.org/Science/Special/feature11.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
199. Bierer et al. provide several fascinating examples of what might comprise immediate-term forms of 
compensation based on accurate appraisals of community needs, such as the building a much-needed 
airstrip for an indigenous community, the organization of community-based public health workshops, 
technical assistance with forest conservation, the development of a system to provide a community with 
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 A medium-term legal agreement could also be forged to allow the indigenous 
community to realize certain benefits from partnering with the outside organization 
before the actual profit sharing begins. These benefits would accrue while any 
products are undergoing the monitoring and evaluation processes, subsequent testing 
and further data gathering, and the time-consuming approvals processes by national 
pharmaceutical regulatory agencies. These medium-term benefits might take the 
form of grassroots capacity building or infrastructural development activities.200
 A long-term legal agreement might exclusively focus on providing the indigenous 
community with a percentage of the proceeds realized by the sale and marketing of 
the final product, or could include longer-term capacity building or infrastructure 
development based on the community’s articulation of its priorities. In addition to 
financial remuneration, long-term legal agreements might additionally reference 
certain moral and relational benefits, such as formal recognition or attribution of the 
role of the indigenous community’s Traditional Knowledge in publications related to 
the development of the product.
 One or more of these frameworks might draw inspiration from the “capability 
approach” elegantly articulated by Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen.201 
Various indigenous communities are keen for some form of development, but not at the 
cost of their culture, Traditional Knowledge, or patrimonial land and resources.202 
When an authoritative international body comprised of indigenous peoples is established 
for indigenous peoples, state-centrism will cease to inform any advisory services it 
provides in the name of effective development policies and human rights protections 
for member cultures. This might include the further ratification of ILO Convention 
169, which affords indigenous peoples certain protections, such as requiring the state to 
consult with indigenous communities prior to searching for natural resources.203
potable water, and the provision of direct medical care to an indigenous community that was dying from 
a strain of malaria for which Shaman Pharmaceuticals provided drug treatment. See id.
200. Bierer et al. provide medium-term examples that include scaling up the indigenous community’s research 
capabilities, such as providing community members with scientific training and equipment, perhaps to 
devolve some components of the data and specimen-gathering processes to the communities themselves, as 
opposed to relying on outside experts time and again. They further suggest that bringing in outside 
experts to work with indigenous communities is an effective way for these communities to benefit from 
shared knowledge in advance of receiving profits from the eventual sale of the final product. See id.
201. See generally Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in The Quality of Life 30 (Martha Nussbaum 
& Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
202. Id.
203. ILO Convention 169, supra note 87, art. 15(2) (“In cases in which the State retains the ownership of 
mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall 
establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to 
ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or 
permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their 
lands.”). However, it is important to note that ILO Convention 169 fails to address indigenous peoples’ 
recognition as “peoples,” nor does it address protection for indigenous territory, and it does not vest 
indigenous peoples with consent or control.
915
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
 These approaches collectively comprise only one potential development which 
might be witnessed in the fullness of time. Broader perspectives on indigenous 
priorities are increasingly reaching the light of day,204 which demonstrates that while 
some indigenous communities may accurately be described as antiglobalization or 
anticapitalist, others are not. Within the confines of certain environmental 
protections and adherence to particular cultural practices, indigenous groups might 
be more open to forming partnerships with outside actors where there had been none 
before. The above approaches to legally binding reciprocity might someday be 
seriously considered by outside actors to build trust and productive, continuing 
relationships with those indigenous groups that are open to partnering.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 Approximately 10,000 years ago, humans developed an elegant approach to exploit 
biodiversity: agriculture. Over time these processes were refined, which resulted in 
continued growth of human settlements, which in turn resulted in further exploitation 
of biodiversity, exponentially accelerating the extraction of natural resources. The 
number of human beings has reached seven billion,205 all of whom are dependent on 
continued access to natural resources—plants, animals, and microorganisms—for the 
production of food, fuel, fertilizer, timber, and medicines.206 Experts with the U.N. 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment207 have ascertained that the human impact on 
biodiversity is dire; even at the current rate of exploitation, to say nothing of the 
exponentially growing demand that comes with explosive population growth, 
ecosystems may not be able to meet the needs of future generations.208 Climate change, 
which authoritative evidence suggests is at least partly due to certain human activities, 
has also jeopardized the future of many forms of biodiversity.209
204. See supra Part III.A.
205. See International Programs, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/population/international/ 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
206. See Hans Hoogeveen, Reflections on COP-6, CBD News, Special Edition 2004, at 29, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/CBD-10th-anniversary.pdf (“We depend largely on our natural 
resources; on our animals, plants, and micro-organisms for the production of food and medicine and for 
the intrinsic value of biological diversity. They are the basis of our existence. They form our vital world, 
in which life is really on the line.”).
207. See Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being (2005), available 
at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf (setting out a general 
outline of ecosystem services and discussing the interrelatedness of human well-being and environmental 
protection).
208. There is an assessment that human beings induced the increase of species-extinction rates by as much as 
1,000 times the typical historical background rates as inferred from fossil records. See Ahmed Djoghlaf, 
The Bonn Biodiversity Summit: Birthplace of a “Globale Naturallianz” for Life on Earth, U.N. Env’t 
Programme, http://www.cbd.int/doc/speech/2008/sp-2008-05-naturallianz-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 
26, 2014).
209. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on Earth: How 
the Convention on Biological Diversity Promotes Nature and Human Well-Being 5 
(2000), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-sustain-en.pdf.
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 The sustained existence of Earth’s natural resources, particularly its biodiversity, 
is of critical importance to human survival, and efforts to safeguard these resources 
can be understood as a form of self-preservation. Commentators have noted that 
biodiversity “provide[s] important services to humans—such as . . . structure, food 
and bio-molecules that can be used for the development of drugs or alternative 
fuels—that increase in value with their richness.”210 The World Bank has stated that:
Biodiversity is the foundation and mainstay of agriculture, forests, and 
fisheries, soil conservation and water quality. Biological resources provide the 
raw materials for livelihoods, sustenance, trade, medicines, and industrial 
development. Genetic diversity provides the basis for new breeding programs, 
improved crops, enhanced agricultural production, and food security. Natural 
habitats and ecosystems provide services—such as water f low, f lood control, 
and coastal protection—that reduce human vulnerability to natural hazards, 
including drought, f loods, tsunamis and hurricanes. Forests, grasslands, 
freshwater and marine habitats provide benefits of global value such as carbon 
sequestration, nutrient and hydrological cycling, and biodiversity conservation. 
Careful ecosystem management provides countless streams of benefits to, and 
opportunities for, human societies, while also supporting and nurturing the 
web of life.211
 It is therefore no surprise that biologist and natural theorist Edward O. Wilson 
has famously written in The Diversity of Life that loss of biodiversity is the “scientific 
problem of great[est] immediate importance for humanity.”212 In the context of 
attempted expropriation of Shuar land for commercial extraction of resources and 
the bioprospecting of plant life from Shuar territory by outside agents who also 
appropriate the Shuar’s Traditional Knowledge, these mind-boggling macro-level 
considerations are certainly at play.
 One of the important challenges for a law influenced by human dignity is that it 
has to fill vacant spaces and gaps in a way that is characteristic of how lawyers define 
problems and purport to solve them. This means that lawyers have had to use the 
human factor to better understand and manipulate both the temporal and spatial 
dimensions of the legal event manifold. What is important is that the human factor 
does seek to fill the gaps, and we see this historically from the operational uses of the 
Roman civil law ius gentium (“law of nations”) to the modern law of human rights in 
the global system.
 The vast regime of national and international law, including international human 
rights bodies, each with varying processes and procedures which cater to particular 
210. See Global Biodiversity Map to Guide Plant Conservation, Botanical Garden Conservation Int’l 
(Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.bgci.org/worldwide/news/0339/.
211. World Bank, Mountains to Coral Reefs: The World Bank and Biodiversity 1 (2006), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTBIODIVERSITY/Resources/M2CRs-web2.pdf.
212. See Wilson, supra note 147, at 254; see also Michel Loreau et al., Diversity Without Representation, 442 
Nature 245 (2006) (remarking on how biodiversity is widely undervalued despite its significant 
importance to humanity); Dobson, supra note 167, at 279 (“Evidence of the value of biodiversity and 
human dependence on its existence is mounting as its current rate of loss escalates.”).
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groups, might not be capable of effectively meting out these indigenous-specific 
protections because such law is not tailored to the issues facing indigenous peoples. 
This lack of a contextually appropriate international body for indigenous peoples to 
pursue particularized claims presents substantive and procedural limitations on the 
international human rights implementation system’s ability to address these claims. 
Some argue that for indigenous peoples to realize their common goal of sustainable 
self-determination, an indigenous-specific framework that provides normative and 
procedural guidance on juxtaposing human rights with culturally sensitive capacity-
building must be developed.213
 This article does not seek to provide an authoritative gloss on efforts undertaken 
to collaborate with the Shuar to help them fend off incursions. It is also not a timely 
or complete commentary on the Shuar’s efforts to protect their Traditional Knowledge 
or their patrimonial land and resources from appropriation—the steps described 
above comprise one small cog in a very large machine. Rather, this article seeks to 
explore opportunities that emerge from a progressive vision of law, which may 
provide techniques to respond to important challenges generated by the legal vacuum 
that earlier law provided for consigning vital indigenous interests. In sum, the issues 
concerning the economic patrimony of indigenous peoples implicate a great deal of 
legal complexity. This requires an interdisciplinary emphasis and a creative use of 
law informed by a modern and f lexible jurisprudential outlook. Effective and 
competent lawyers are needed, now more than ever, to engage in the protection of 
the vital interests of the world’s indigenous populations.
213. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 1, pmbl. (affirming “the fundamental 
importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples”).
